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In the present paper, the origins of some of Joseph Alois Schumpeter’s views are traced 
back to Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital, regarding the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
and the separation of roles between capitalists, entrepreneurs and managers. After a 
careful examination of Hilferding’s writings, the conclusion may be drawn that 
Schumpeter expresses ideas very similar to Hilferding’s on these issues, and seems to 
have been influenced by his conceptualisation of a “latest phase” of capitalism, shaped by 
the structure and functions of the “monopolistic enterprise”. Hilferding’s approach is 
understood in this paper as a major revision of Marx’s methodological perspective and 
conceptual understanding of the capitalist mode of production and, therefore, as a 
“paradigm shift” within Marxian economic theory.  
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There is no doubt that Joseph Alois Schumpeter “was one of the greatest economists of 
all time” (Haberler 1950: 1).1 Given Schumpeter’s various theories and the modern spin-
offs of his work, the issue of which theories or ideas might have influenced his thought 
becomes of great interest and deserves analysis. In other words, the question posed is the 
following: what were the main influences behind Schumpeter, in the development of his 
ideas, and to what extent, if any, can his views be traced back to earlier works? This 
paper attempts to provide a partial answer to this question, regarding the affinity of 
certain Schumpeterian elaborations with Hilferding’s theory of monopoly capitalism.  
It is true that there is a gap in economic literature concerning the influence that 
Hilferding’s work might have exercised on Schumpeter, and with the exception of very 
few papers (e.g. Fritz and Haulman 1987) no research seems to have been done on this 
important issue. In this framework, we will investigate some of Hilferding’s ideas to fill 
in a gap concerning the originality of certain economic notions, which are of primary 
importance in the history of economic thought. Following Backhouse, we would like to 
affirm the following thesis, which has been the point of departure of our investigation: 
 “[T]he history of economic thought is concerned […] primarily, with who first 
invented particular concepts. It is of course important to be as accurate as possible in 
ascribing priority in the development of economic ideas, but […] the date when an idea 
came into general circulation may be more important than the date of the earliest 
document in which the idea can be found” (Backhouse 1985: 8).  
More precisely, the purpose of the present paper is to show how the book Finance 
Capital, published by the Austrian Marxist economist Rudolf Hilferding at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, influenced some of Joseph Alois Schumpeter’s analyses. In this 
                                                          
1 Tibor Scitovski (1980: 1) places Joseph Alois Schumpeter at the highest level in economic thought: “America’s most 
brilliant economist”. On the other hand, the historian Martin Kessler (1961: 334) agrees that, apart from Keynes, 
Schumpeter was “the only truly great economist the twentieth century has produced”. Oscar Morgenstern (1951: 203) 
claims: “all will agree that [Schumpeter] belongs to that small top group where further ranking becomes almost 
impossible”. Many other historians, like Alfred Chandler, Jr. (1962: 284), regard Schumpeter as the economist with the 
best understanding of the rise of big business and the crucial role of innovation and entrepreneurship. Also, the works 
of Nathan Rosenberg (1982), William Lazonick (1990), F. M. Scherer (1984) and R.R. Nelson (1982) are influenced 
by the Schumpeterian doctrine. Even Michael Porter (1985) places a distinctive emphasis on Schumpeterian innovation 
as the essence of competitive advantage.     
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context, a major scope of the paper is to promote dialogue between Marxist and 
Schumpeterian political economy, which is a very barely-developed area of analysis.  
The outline of this paper is as follows: section 2 offers a brief biographical 
presentation of both economists’ life and work; in section 3 we explore Hilferding’s 
influence on the formulation of what has been codified as the Schumpeterian hypothesis; 
section 4 investigates the influence of Hilferding’s work upon Schumpeter’s approach to 
the separation of roles between capitalist(s), entrepreneur(s) and manager(s); section 5 
elaborates on the paradigm shift that was introduced in Marxian economic theory by 
Hilferding’s Finance Capital in order to defend the paper’s main thesis; namely that 
Schumpeter drew arguments and ideas from the version of Marxism established after 
Hilferding’s theoretical intervention; finally, section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Rudolf Hilferding: Brief Biographical Notes 
 
Before starting developing our argument on the way that Hilferding’s Finance Capital 
might have shaped some of Schumpeter’s analyses, we will devote a few lines to a brief 
presentation of the life and works of the two Austrian economists. If not otherwise stated, 
the information is drawn from the Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political 
Economy (Milios 2001: 676-8), the New Palgrave (Green 1990: 201-2) and the 
International Institute of Social History (2001: Internet), as well as from the authors’ 
personal archives.     
 
2.1 Joseph Alois Schumpeter  
 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950), the son of a cloth manufacturer, was born in 
Triesch in the Austrian part of Moravia, in what was then the Hapsburg Empire (now part 
of the Czech Republic) and died in Taconic, Connecticut. As already noted, he is widely 
regarded as one of the most influential economists of the twentieth century. His works 
include economic theorizing on the matters of economic development, innovation and 
some specific, more “sociological” issues, such as imperialism and modern democracy.  
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In 1901 Schumpeter enrolled in the faculty of law at the University of Vienna, 
and continued his studies in Berlin and London. He studied economic theory under 
Friedrich von Wieser, Eugen von Philippovich and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk. In 1905 he 
took part in Böhm-Bawerk’s Seminar, where the latter’s criticism of Marx was one of the 
topics of debate. A year later, in 1906, he took the degree Doctor utriusque iuris (doctor 
of law).   
In 1909, thanks to Böhm-Bawerk (Kisch 1979: 143), Schumpeter became an 
Assistant Professor at the University of Czernowitz, the capital of Bukowina, then the 
easternmost province of Austria, which in 1918 became part of Rumania, in 1939 was 
annexed by the U.S.S.R., in 1941 returned to Rumania, at the end of World War II was 
again part of the U.S.S.R., and today is in the Ukraine. Between 1911 and 1919 he taught 
Political Economy as a Full Professor in Graz, the capital of the Austrian province of 
Styria, while in 1913 – at the age of thirty – and in 1914 he was an Exchange Professor at 
Columbia University.  
In 1918, he became member of the German Socialisation Commission 
(Sozialisierungskommission), and in 1919 he was appointed Minister of Finance in the 
new government formed by the Social Democrats (Haberler 1950: 346).  
In 1921 Schumpeter became president of a highly respected private banking 
house (Biederman Bank) in Vienna, and when the bank collapsed in 1924 after the great 
inflation in Germany, he returned to the academic world and in 1925 accepted a 
professorship at the University of Bonn in Germany. From 1932 until his death he taught 
at Harvard University, and he served as president of the American Economic Association, 
the first foreign-born economist to attain this distinction (Oser and Blanchfield 1975: 
451).  
Schumpeter’s writings cover a very broad range of topics, but certain major 
motifs can be identified: (a) The dynamics of economic development, a subject on which 
he elaborated extensively in his Theory of Economic Development, whose first German 
edition was published in 1912 (preface dated Vienna, July 1911), with an English 
translation issued in 1934. His voluminous book on Business Cycles (1939), which 
discusses an extensive historical and statistical material regarding the development and 
the fluctuations of capitalist economies, belongs to the same area; (b) The integration of 
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economic, sociological and political perspectives with regard to the feasibility of 
capitalism and socialism, which is documented in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
published in 1942; (c) The essence and history of economic concepts, which is reflected 
by his Epochen der Dogmen- und Methodengeschichte (1914), translated in 1954 as 
Economic Doctrine and Method, and his classic History of Economic Analysis, published 
posthumously in 1954.  
 
2.2 Rudolf Hilferding 
 
Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941) was born in Vienna and died in Paris. He is regarded as 
one of the most prominent Austrian Marxist economists and socialist politicians of the 
20th century. With his Finance Capital (1910), Hilferding changed the dominant 
theoretical paradigm in Marxist economic theory, as he introduced in it the idea of 
“stages” of capitalism and the notion of “monopoly capitalism” (Milios 2001, see also 
what follows).  
Hilferding studied medicine at the University of Vienna, where Joseph 
Schumpeter was also a student, and obtained his doctorate in 1901. However, he 
practised medicine only until 1906 (returning briefly during his military service in the 
First World War), and thereafter devoted himself exclusively to politics and the study of 
economic theory.  
At the age of fifteen, he joined the socialist movement and from 1902 he 
contributed frequently to Die Neue Zeit, the theoretical journal of the German Social-
Democratic Party (S.P.D.). Between 1904 and 1923 he published, along with Max Adler, 
the Marx Studien, as a means of expression for the emerging Austrian Marxism. In issue 
No 1, his first important monograph was published, under the title Böhm-Bawerk’s 
Criticism of Marx.  
In 1905 Hilferding participated in the Seminar on economic theory directed by 
Böhm-Bawerk. In 1906 he accepted an invitation from the S.P.D. and tutored for a year 
at the party school in Berlin. Immediately afterwards he was appointed to foreign editor 
of the party’s newspaper, Vorwärts.  
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 After the publication of his major work Finance Capital, in 1910, Hilferding was 
praised as one of the most pre-eminent Marxist theoreticians, his book being hailed as a 
continuation of Marx’s Capital. As a recognized Marxist theoretician, Hilferding was 
appointed to a member of the scientific Committee that formulated the editorial principles 
for the publication of the Collected Works of Marx and Engels. 
 In Finance Capital, Hilferding introduced the notion of a “latest phase” of 
capitalism, characterized by the following features: (a) the formation of monopolistic 
enterprises, which put aside competition; (b) the fusion of bank and industrial capital 
leading thus to the formation of finance capital, which was considered to be the ultimate 
form of capital; (c) the subordination of the state to monopolies and finance capital; and 
finally (d) the formation of a protectionist and expansionist policy. 
The idea of a “latest” stage of capitalism possessing the above described features 
was adopted by Bukharin, Lenin and others, thus shaping the so-called Marxist theories 
of “monopoly capitalism” that dominated Soviet Marxism. However, “Hilferding went 
far beyond any previous Marxist” in the thoroughness with which he formulated this 
theoretical approach (Winslow 1931: 728).    
 Finance Capital (1910) was Hilferding’s last book, as he began to devote himself 
full-time to politics soon after its publication. In 1914 he voted against war credits, and 
joined the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (U.S.P.D.), which emerged 
from a split with the S.P.D. In 1918, he became member of the German Socialisation 
Commission, which also included Schumpeter and was presided over by Karl Kautsky 
(Kirsch 1979: 147). In 1922, after the majority faction of the U.S.P.D. had been 
transformed to the German Communist Party (K.P.D.), Hilferding followed the party’s 
minority faction, which returned to the S.P.D. He became editor of the party’s theoretical 
journal, Die Gesellschaft and also served twice as Minister of Finance, in 1923 and 1928-
9.  
 When Hitler came to power in 1933, Hilferding had to go into exile, being not 
only a socialist, but also Jewish. He fled to Denmark in 1933, then stayed for several 
years in Switzerland and in 1939 went to Paris. In February 1941 he was handed over to 
the Nazis by the Vichy government and died in Paris either by suicide or from injuries 
inflicted by the Gestapo.  
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2.3 Schumpeter and Hilferding: The Interaction  
 
From Schumpeter’s biography we know that he spent a significant part of his life in 
Vienna. Then he lived in other cities of Austrian-Hungary and payed longer visits to 
London, Berlin, Cairo, New York and elsewhere. If we include his extensive reading in 
German, English, French, Italian, Latin and Greek we may conclude that he was a 
cosmopolitan (Haberler 1951: ix, Andersen 1991: 6), not only as a man, but also as a 
theoretician, i.e. as regards the possible influences on his thought. However, if we include 
some knowledge of general history as well as of Schumpeter’s preferences, we may 
delimit our main focus in Vienna (Andersen 1991: 6). This conclusion was also reached 
by his colleague Gottfried Haberler at the occasion of his death: “Although he 
[Schumpeter] became one of the most cosmopolitan of men, the experience of those early 
years in Vienna never really left him” (Haberler 1951: ix, emphasis added). 
 The Vienna of Schumpeter’s youth was a “melting pot” of policies, nationalities, 
and theories.2 His experience was primarily gathered in Vienna and was used effectively 
in his own theory of economic development. In this intellectual environment Böhm-
Bawerk’s personality, despite not being widely known abroad, was dominant.3 As a 
teacher, Böhm-Bawerk was quite liberal, especially during summer-terms when he was 
the leader of seminar discussions; there the students had a chance to develop their views 
and fight for them intellectually. During Schumpeter’s student years, political and 
intellectual conflicts had become extremely aggravated and it was in this theoretical 
environment that he built his skills in discussion and theoretical construction (Andersen 
1991: 20).    
In the 1905 Böhm-Bawerk’s Seminars in Vienna, many prominent Marxists 
participated (Taylor 1951: 547), among them Emil Lederer, later Professor in Heidelberg 
and Berlin and founder of the New School for Social Research in New York (Haberler 
1950: 337) and Otto Bauer, the brilliant theorist and intellectual leader of the Austrian 
                                                          
2 Following Andersen (1991), we may say that Schumpeter stayed all his life, whether located in Austria, Germany or 
the U.S., a sharp-minded and cosmopolite member of the part of the Viennese intelligentsia who “tried to come to grips 
with the basic contradictions between stability and radical change, classical harmony and irreconcilable conflict” 
(Andersen 1991: 6). 
3 According to Schumpeter, Böhm-Bawerk had become “bourgeois Marx” (Schumpeter 1954: 846). 
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socialist movement after 1918 (Haberler 1950: 337), member of the 1919 Republican 
Government (together with Schumpeter) and, afterwards, physical leader of the Austrian 
Democratic Party until fascism (Andersen 1991: 20).  
However, as Bottomore (1978) and Andersen (1991) have pointed out, for 
Schumpeter, “even more important was the encounter with […] the leading 
representative of the new Austro-Marxist School: Rudolf Hilferding, twice Minister of 
Finance in the German Republic” (Andersen 1991: 20, emphasis added). It was 
Hilferding (along with Otto Bauer) who had recently formulated an open-minded 
research program on the critique of Bernstein’s “Evolutionary Socialism”. At that time, 
in 1905, Hilferding was finishing his path-breaking book Finance Capital (Andersen 
1991: 21), a significant contribution to 20th century Marxian Economics which was 
published five years later (1910), in Germany. In fact, according to Faltello and 
Jovanovic (1997), during the Seminar meetings, in 1905, Hilferding had already written 
the first full draft of it.  
Thus, referring to those Seminar meetings in 1905, Andersen (1991: 21) wrote: 
“With such young men Schumpeter had a unique opportunity to discuss major visions of 
the world and analytical techniques, both at the University and at Vienna’s famous 
cafes”. Schumpeter seems to have done so, and been inspired by those discussions in the 
Seminar meetings. As Schumpeter’s colleague Haberler pointed out, he had conceived 
the fundamental ideas (fully expanded in the Theory of Economic Development) in 1905 
(Haberler 1950: 341).4  
It was also in these Seminars that Schumpeter became well acquainted with 
certain interpretations of Marxian theory, as well as with the socialist movement and the 
psychology of its leaders, a fact which later allowed him to present a “long series of 
articles culminating in his book, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy […]”, which 
therefore also “originated in those Seminar meetings” (Haberler 1950: 338).  
                                                          
4 Schumpeter himself, wrote in his Preface to the English edition of the Theory of Economic Development: “Some of 
the ideas submitted in this book go back as far as 1907” (Schumpeter 1912: ix), while in his preface to the first German 
edition “Schumpeter stated that he had conceived the fundamental ideas as early as 1905” (Haberler 1950: 341, 
emphasis added). Andersen (1991: 20, fn. 30) believes that the age of the members of the seminar gives some hints 
concerning their relation to Schumpeter: Lederer (1882-1939), Bauer (1881-1938), Hilferding (1877-1941). Obviously, 
Hilferding was the oldest and presumably the most educated discussant, since he had obtained his doctorate in 1901 
from the University of Vienna.    
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Our view that Böhm-Bawerk’s Seminar in 1905 was a turning point in the 
formation of Schumpeter’s thought, and that ideas and questions formulated during that 
period (a theoretical interaction in which Rudolf Hilferding certainly played an important 
role) served as a point of departure for the later development of his theories, is 
completely consistent with the approach of Andersen, who wrote: “The period of broad 
search in neighbouring fields and of sensitivity to the new trends […] should probably be 
seen […] in the case of Schumpeter, roughly in the […] subperiod which was especially 
crucial to Schumpeter, namely the years 1905-1909. There can be little doubt that it was 
during that period that Schumpeter obtained something which can be described as a 
vision which became a guiding thread for much of his analytic work” (Andersen 1991: 5-
6, emphasis added).  
As the available material demonstrates, the two fellow students, Schumpeter and 
Hilferding, seemed to be on good terms from the beginning of their acquaintance, 
(Haberler 1950: 337) and later became friends (Taylor 1951: 547). The two theoreticians’ 
interaction must have continued in the years that followed Böhm-Bawerks Seminar and 
the publication of Finance Capital by Hilferding, and in 1918 Schumpeter became 
member of the German Socialization Commission (Sozialisierungskommission), signing 
the majority report, which pleaded for socialization of the economy as a means of 
increasing economic efficiency.5 The Socialization Commission, was presided over by 
another Marxist, Karl Kautsky (Kirsch 1979: 147), on whom, according to some 
commentators, “fell the task of carrying on where Marx […] left off” (Winslow 1931: 
719). In the next year, the Social Democrats emerged as the largest party in Austria and 
formed the new government under the leadership of Carl Renner, a right wing socialist 
(Haberler 1950: 346). Schumpeter became the Minister of Finance, a position that 
Hilferding also occupied twice later, in 1922 and 1928-9.  
                                                          
5 This membership has been often regarded as proof of his flirtation with socialist ideas (Haberler 1950: 345). For 
instance, the editor of the German translation of Schumpeter’s book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Edgar 
Salin, wrote in his introduction: “Schumpeter ist Sozialist” and later again referred to him as “that socialist” (Salin, E., 
“Einleitung” in Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Bern, 1946: 8). However, this should be doubtful to anyone 
familiar with Schumpeter’s work. It was as a member of this Commission, that Schumpeter gave his well-known reply 
to a young economist asking how he could be connected to this Socialization Commission, despite not being a socialist 
(“if by that word we designate those who advocate socialism” [Haberler 1950: 369, fn. 3]). Schumpeter replied: “If 
somebody wants to commit suicide, it is a good thing if a doctor is present” (cited in Kirsch, 1979: 147). As Haberler 
(1950: 369, fn 3) correctly pointed out, “it is true that Schumpeter was pessimistic with respect to capitalism’s chances 
of survival”, however, “to call him a socialist is like calling Cassandra a Greek partisan because she prophesied the fall 
of Troy”. 
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Concluding we may reiterate that it is, of course, a “vain endeavour to attempt to 
analyse the often complex interconnections between economic theorists” (Foster 1983: 
327). However, it is evident that there was significant interaction between Hilferding and 
Schumpeter. They were both Austrian, had studied at the University of Vienna, had 
participated in Böhm-Bawerk’s influential Seminar meetings in 1905 and had spent a 
large part of their lives in Vienna, as prominent members of the Viennese intelligentsia 
and political personnel, at a time when the city functioned as the “intellectual melting 
pot” of the world. In 1905, when Hilferding – who was six years older that Schumpeter – 
was finishing the first full draft of his Finance Capital (1910), Schumpeter, as material 
evidence indicates, conceived his fundamental ideas presented in his Theory of Economic 
Development (1912), and got inspired for writing his Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (1942). Also, they both served as members of the German Socialisation 
Commission in 1918 and later as Ministers of Finance in Social-Democratic cabinets.  
These facts do not, of course, proclaim that both theoreticians should develop any 
similar theories and ideas. However, the facts show that both thinkers developed certain 
of their major theories in the same social, political, theoretical and ideological 
environment, and that they were well acquainted with each other’s ideas. We may 
suppose, therefore, that the similarities of certain Schumpeterian elaborations with 
theoretical theses and analyses originally formulated and introduced in Marxian 
economics by Rudolf Hilferding (see below) is not accidental, but the outcome of this 
long acquaintance and interaction between the two Austrian economists. 
 
3. Market Structure and Technological Progress  
 
According to Schumpeter, even before he had developed what is now described as the 
“Schumpeterian hypothesis”, economic development is accompanied by growth, i.e. 
sustained increases in national income; however quantitative growth does not constitute 
development per se. He wrote: 
  “[W]hat we are about to consider is that kind of change arising from […] the 
system which so displaces its equilibrium point that the new one cannot be reached from 
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the old one by infinitesimal steps. Add successively as many coaches as you please, you 
will never get a railway thereby” (Schumpeter 1912: 64, emphasis added).  
Real economic growth and development depends primarily upon productivity 
increases based on “innovation”.  More precisely, for Schumpeter this concept covered 
the following five cases:  
“1. The introduction of a new good – that is one with which consumers are not 
familiar – or a new quality of a good.  
2. The introduction of a new method of production, that is one not yet tested by 
experience in the branch of manufacture concerned, which need by no means to be 
founded upon a discovery scientifically new, and can also exist in a new way of handling 
commodity commercially. 
3. The opening of a new market that is a market into which the country in question 
has not previously entered, whether or not this market has existed before.  
4. The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured 
goods, again irrespective of whether it has first to be created. 
5. The carrying out of the new organisation of any industry, like the creation of a 
monopoly position (for example through trustification) or the breaking up of a monopoly 
position” (Schumpeter 1912: 66).  
In this context, he used the term “technological progress” to characterize these 
changes (Scherer 1992: 1417). These changes account for the greater part of economic 
development. He clearly distinguished this process from growth due to the gradual 
increase in population and capital. He wrote:  
“The slow and continuous increase in time of the national supply of productive 
means and of savings is the obviously an important factor in explaining the course of 
economic history through centuries, but it is completely overshadowed by the fact that 
development consists primarily in employing existing resources in a different way, in 
doing new things with them, irrespective of whether those resources increase or not” 
(Schumpeter 1942: 65). 
The Schumpeterian hypothesis was formulated along this line of reasoning, as a 
response to the question of “who is actually the vehicle of innovation and technological 
progress”, and can be summarized as follows (Mokyr 1990: 267, emphasis added):  
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“large firms with considerable market power, rather than perfectly competitive 
firms were the ‘most powerful engine of technological progress’” (Schumpeter 1942: 
106).  
Economists have been discussing this hypothesis for many years now, and the 
literature is summarized elsewhere (e.g. Scherer 1980: ch. 15, Kamien and Schwartz 
1982, Baldwin and Scott 1987).  
Schumpeter criticized traditional price theory for its misleading focus of analysis 
on perfect competition:  
“It is still competition within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of 
production and forms of industrial organization in particular, that practically monopolizes 
attention” (Schumpeter 1942: 84). 
However, according to Schumpeter’s understanding of competition:  
“[I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [perfect] 
competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest – scale 
unit of control for instance) – competition which commands a decisive cost or quality 
advantage […]. This kind of competition is much more effective than the other” 
(Schumpeter 1942: 84-5). 
 In his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter rejected perfect 
competition as an ideal market structure in capitalism, and dismissed the idea of “an 
entirely golden age of perfect competition” as mere “wishful thinking” (1942: 81). He 
wrote:  
“[P]erfect competition is not only impossible but inferior” (Schumpeter 1942: 
106). 
 Schumpeter believed that perfect competition is not favourable to technological 
progress, for two reasons: (a) the system of perfect competition cannot lead to high 
profitability and thus it cannot create real incentives for innovation; (b) the system of 
perfect competition cannot create incentives for the capitalist and the enterprise to 
undertake risky and uncertain projects, because it is unable to guarantee, as a reward, an 
extra profit. More precisely, by incorporating new technologies, new types of 
organization, etc., innovations create surpluses of revenues over costs. Competition, 
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however, tends to eliminate these extra revenues (extra profits), but the “spread of 
monopolist structures” and the ability of big enterprises to promote innovation constantly 
recreates them (Schumpeter 1942: 81 ff.).   
 In fact, in the Theory of Economic Development (1912), the predominant role of 
large oligopolistic firms in technical innovation had been already acknowledged by 
Schumpeter: 
 “And if the competitive economy is broken up by the growth of great combines, 
as it is increasingly the case today in all countries, then this must become more and more 
true of real life, and the carrying out of new combinations must become in ever greater 
measure the internal concern of one and the same economic body. The difference so 
made is great enough to serve as the water-shed between two epochs in the social history 
of capitalism” (Schumpeter 1912: 67, emphasis added). 
However, Hilferding seems to have developed first this idea, which is detectable 
in the Schumpeterian hypothesis, namely that development mainly depends on large non-
competitive enterprises, whose technological superiority derives from their ability to 
attain profits high above the average. Just like Schumpeter, Hilferding believed that: 
“[T]he reduction of profit in the non-monopolised industries is bound to retard 
their development”, whereas:  
“Cartelisation brings exceptionally large extra profits” (Hilferding 1910: 233) that 
function as incentives for undertaking such entrepreneurial acts, which, in turn, will lead 
to the further empowerment of the non-competitive, monopolistic formations. Hilferding 
considered technical progress to be the condition sine qua non for assuring a cartel’s or a 
trust’s supremacy in the market: 
“[O]nce a combination has come into existence as a result of economic forces it 
will very soon present opportunities for the introduction of technical improvements in the 
process of production” (Hilferding 1910: 197).6 In fact: “They are obliged to introduce 
                                                          
6 By combination, Hilferding (1910: 197) meant “an association of capitalist enterprises in which one supplies the raw 
materials for another”. Further, he argued that: “The unification of enterprises can take two forms. The enterprises may 
retain a formal independence, and affirm their association only by agreements, in which case we are faced with a 
‘consortium’ (Interessengemeinschaft). If, however, the enterprises are dissolved in a new enterprise, this is called a 
‘merger’ (Fusion). Both a consortium and a merger may be either partial, in which case free competition continues to 
prevail in the branch of industry concerned, or monopolistic” (Hilferding 1910: 197). As far as the cartel is concerned, 
he wrote: “A consortium comprising as many enterprises as possible, which is intended to raise prices, and hence 
profits, by excluding competition as completely as possible, is a cartel. Or, in other words, a cartel is monopolistic 
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these [technical] improvements, for otherwise there is a danger that some outsider will 
use them in a renewed competitive struggle […]. [I]n this case technical improvements 
mean an extra profit, which is not eliminated by competition” (Hilferding 1910: 233). 
It is this technical superiority that makes the monopolistic formations able to 
maintain and constantly reproduce their dominant role: “These technical advantages, 
once achieved, in turn become powerful motive for forming combinations where purely 
economic factors would not have brought them about” (Hilferding 1910: 197). “The 
corporation can thus be equipped in a technically superior fashion, and what is just as 
important, can maintain this technical superiority” (Hilferding 1910: 123).   
The thesis regarding the limited ability of free competition to promote 
technological progress is supposed to be, for both theoreticians, a conclusion drawn from 
past historical experience.  
More precisely, Schumpeter argued that, until then, the capitalist era could be 
divided into two distinct periods (Screpanti and Zamagni 1993: 243 ff.): (a) The era 
“competitive capitalism” when small enterprises dominated, an era which declines in the 
1880s and (b), the era of monopolistic or “big-business capitalism”, during which large 
enterprises, trusts and cartels dominated, starting roughly from the 1880s and having 
consolidated its fully fledged form by the time Schumpeter’s book was written. 
Considering the fact that before 1880 a system more close to the model of perfect 
competition dominated, the author claimed that by simply comparing the rates of growth 
of the competitive period with those of the big-business period, the superiority of 
monopolistic capitalism could easily be confirmed.  
But for Hilferding, as well, the elimination of free competition and monopolies 
came, historically, in a similar way: “Finance capital signifies the unification of capital. 
The previously separate spheres of industrial, commercial and bank capital are brought 
under the common direction of high finance, in which the masters of industry and of the 
banks are united in a close personal association” and consequently: “The basis of this 
association is the elimination of free competition among individual capitalists by the 
large monopolistic combines” (Hilferding 1910: 301, emphasis added). Thus, “it is also 
clear that monopolistic combines will control the market” (Hilferding 1910: 193).   
                                                                                                                                                                             
consortium. A merger which is designed to attain the same end, by the same means, is a trust. A trust then is a 
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We have seen, so far, that for both theoreticians, the real incentive for innovation 
was the ability of monopolistic formations – deriving from their non-competitive nature – 
to create extra profits. Also, the elimination of free competition was regarded, by both 
economists, as the main characteristic of an era, during which large enterprises, trusts and 
cartels dominated, and which attained its typical characteristics at the turn of the 20th 
century. 
As far as the other aspect of the so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis is concerned, 
namely that perfect competition is an unstable market structure and therefore only large 
enterprises can push technological progress forward, the views of both theoreticians are 
again, in our opinion, strikingly similar.  
More precisely, in Schumpeter’s point of view, once big corporations are formed, 
the imperfectly competitive market structure that is thus shaped becomes stable, as large 
firms become increasingly conducive to technological progress and change7:  
“There are superior methods available to the monopolist which either are not 
available at all to a crowd of competitors or are not available to them so readily” 
(Schumpeter 1942: 101). “The perfectly bureaucratized giant industrial unit […] ousts the 
small or medium-sized firm” (Schumpeter 1942: 134).  
In the same line of argument, the large firm is considered to possess the ability to 
attract superior “brains”, to secure a high financial standing (Schumpeter 1942: 110), and 
to deploy an array of practices in order to protect their risk-bearing investments.  
In his Finance Capital, Hilferding had developed a similar approach: “The 
expansion of the capitalist enterprise which has been converted into a corporation […] 
can now conform simply with the demands of technology. The introduction of new 
machinery, the assimilation of related branches of production, the exploitation of patents, 
now takes place […] from the standpoint of their technical and economic suitability. […] 
Business opportunities can be exploited more effectively, more thoroughly, and more 
quickly […] A corporation […] is able, therefore, to organize its plant according to 
purely technical considerations, whereas the individual entrepreneur is always restricted 
[…] The corporation can thus be equipped in a technically superior fashion, and what is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
monopolistic merger” (Hilferding 1910: 198). 
7 For an excellent description of the dynamics of capitalist change in the Schumpeterian system s. Oakley (1990) and 
McKee (1991). 
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just as important, can maintain this technical superiority. This also means that the 
corporation can install new technology and labour saving processes before they come 
into general use, and hence produce on a large scale, and with improved, modern 
techniques, thus gaining an extra profit, as compared with the individually owned 
enterprise” (Hilferding 1910: 123-124).  
Consequently, “The introduction of improved techniques […] [benefits] the 
tightly organized cartels and trusts. [T]he largest concerns introduce the improvements 
and expand their production” (Hilferding 1910: 233). 
     Hilferding repeatedly affirmed the position that the big corporation is able to 
create the conditions which may assure its market supremacy as well as its extra profits 
for a long period: “An industrial enterprise which enjoys technical and economic 
superiority can count upon dominating the market after a successful competitive struggle, 
can increase its sales, and after eliminating its competitors, rake in extra profits over a 
long period” (Hilferding 1910: 191). 
  Thus, Hilferding expressed what we could codify as “Hilferding’s Hypothesis”, 
namely the thesis that “the size and technical equipment of the monopolistic combination 
ensure its superiority” (Hilferding 1910: 201, emphasis added), which is, in general 
terms, very similar to the so-called “Schumpeter’s Hypothesis”, written thirty two years 
after Hilferding: “large firms with considerable market power, rather than perfectly 
competitive firms were the ‘most powerful engine of technological progress’” 
(Schumpeter 1942: 106). The obvious similarity of ideas of both theoreticians on this 
specific issue needs no further comment.  
Further to the above, Hilferding introduced, in his Finance Capital, as already 
mentioned the notion of a “latest phase” of capitalism, which is characterized by the 
following main features: the formation of monopolistic enterprises, which put aside 
capitalist competition; the fusion of bank and industrial capital leading thus to the 
formation of finance capital, which is considered to be the ultimate form of capital; the 
subordination of the state to monopolies and the finance capital and, finally, the 
formation of an expansionist policy of colonial annexations and war.8  
                                                          
8 “The policy of finance capital has three objectives: (1) to establish the largest possible territory; (2) to close this 
territory to foreign competition by a wall of protective tariffs, and consequently (3) to reserve it as an area of 
exploitation for the national monopolistic combinations” (Hilferding 1910: 326). 
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 Hilferding utilized the above theoretical scheme to interpret capital exports as an 
inherent characteristic of capitalism in its “latest”, monopolistic, stage, rooted in the 
“cartelisation and trustification” of the economy and the need “to annex neutral foreign 
markets [...] above all overseas colonial territories” (Hilferding 1910: 326, 328).  
More specifically, he comprehended capital export on the basis of a twofold 
approach. On the one hand, the surplus of capital approach, which claims that in 
industrial countries “while the volume of capital intended for accumulation increases 
rapidly, investment opportunities contract. This contradiction demands a solution, which 
it finds in the export of capital” (Hilferding 1910: 234); on the other hand, the colonial 
extra profits approach, which claims that colonial or low wage countries become “a 
source of extra profits by [...] reducing the cost price of industrial products” and that, 
therefore, these territories “can have great importance for the most powerful capitalist 
groups” (Hilferding 1910: 328).  
Finance capital, as Hilferding defined it, is advanced to industrial capitalists who 
use it. This “new” concept, not only is regarded as the dominant force in capitalism, but 
is also seen as the linking between capitalism’s “latest” stage and imperialism (Winslow 
1932: 727). At home, wrote Hilferding, finance capital seeks domination by organizing 
industries into monopolies and at the same time seeks to secure exclusive control of the 
domestic market by excluding foreign competition by means of tariff walls. Thus finance 
capital “does not want freedom, but domination” (Hilferding 1910: 426). The colonies 
were regarded as the outlets for the export of finance capital. In this sense, finance capital 
was considered to be helpless without political and military support: “capital export 
works for an imperialistic policy” (Hilferding 1910: 406). 
Imperialism is, thus, a tendency to expansion of a developed capitalist power, a 
tendency created, in the last instance, by economic processes, but also supported by 
political and ideological processes. It is argued, therefore, that imperialism, which is the 
capitalist rivalry at its highest level, leads to war and mutual destruction of capitalist 
powers.9 
                                                          
9 The idea of a “latest”, monopolistic-imperialist stage of capitalism dominated, until recently, most Marxist streams of 
thought, and especially Soviet Marxism. For a compendious presentation and critique of these theories, with emphasis 
on the differences between the different approaches and on their contradictions, see Milios (1999).  
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On this issue Schumpeter clearly differentiated himself from Hilferding – and also 
from all other Marxist approaches that conceived imperialism as an indispensable trend 
of the “latest phase” of capitalism. He limited the field of discussion at once, by defining 
imperialism as the “objectless disposition of a state toward unlimited and violent 
expansion” (Schumpeter 1919: 3). Schumpeter considered imperialism to be an obsolete 
policy and regime, i.e. an absolutist remnant, which was bound to fade away with the 
development of modern capitalism. Indeed, he regarded imperialism, as an “old” 
inheritance from pre-modern capitalist eras, which was going to disappear, contrarily to 
Hilferding, who regarded imperialism as a “new”, inherent characteristic of capitalism in 
its “latest”, monopolistic, stage: “A purely capitalist world […] can offer no fertile soil to 
imperialist impulses. This does not mean that it cannot maintain an interest in imperialist 
impulses” (Schumpeter 1951: 69).  
He so regarded expansion and war as a possible outcome of intra-state 
(imperialist) rivalries, and pointed out to the various forces opposed to militarism and 
war. He claimed that the socialist perspective could be comprehended as an attempt 
towards a solution to the problem of imperialism.  
Schumpeter (1919: 296-7) gave Hilferding credit for working out such problems, 
and believed that factors impelling imperialistic policies are not lacking in the capitalist 
society. He finally remarked that many elements (e.g. tariffs, cartels, trusts, monopolies), 
which were analysed as a part of the “economic” framework of imperialism, were 
political and, possibly, pre-capitalist in origin (Schumpeter 1919: 295).10 
Conclusively, Schumpeter, contrary to Hilferding, defended the thesis that 
imperialism is not a “necessary stage of capitalism”. In this framework, the famous 
Marxist economist Paul M. Sweezy claimed that Schumpeter’s essay on imperialism was 
a corrective supplement to his own Theory of Economic Development, repairing the 
                                                          
10 He agreed with Hilferding that cartels and trusts can achieve their highest purpose, which is complete monopoly, 
only under the shelter of protective tariffs, but he added that such measures, in origin and nature, were political and 
eventually pre-capitalist. However, he also stressed the fact that imperialist motives arise from the process of 
cartelization. He wrote: “It was neo-Marxist doctrine that first tellingly described this causal connection (Bauer) and 
fully recognized the significance of the ‘functional change in protectionism’ (Hilferding) […]; Thus we have here, 
within a social group that carries great political weight, a strong undeniable, economic interest in such things as 
protective tariffs, cartels, monopoly prices, forced exports (dumping), an aggressive economic policy, an aggressive 
foreign policy generally, and war, including wars of expansion with typically imperialist character” (Schumpeter 1951: 
79; 83-84).   
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latter’s omission of any explanation of “imperialism and war” as an aspect of “capitalist 
reality” (Schumpeter 1951, Preface by Sweezy).  
Schumpeter wrote his essay on imperialism at a time (1919) when historical 
events (World War I) seemed to have verified the postulate of Marxist authors like 
Hilferding, Bukharin, Lenin and others, that modern capitalism included imperialism as 
one of its indispensable features. It is evident, therefore, that his approach may be 
regarded as a critique to this postulate. As Taylor (1951: 546) correctly concluded:    
“There is no doubt at all that the purpose […] of this essay [The Sociology of 
Imperialisms (1919)] was to counter the essence […] of the modern-Marxist (Bauer-
Hilferding) theory of capitalist imperialism, with a radically different as well as more 
complex and adequate theory of imperialism”. 
At this point, we must insist on the fact that despite his differentiation from the 
thesis that imperialism consisted an inherent feature of modern capitalism, Schumpeter 
always argued on the basis of the theory originally introduced by Rudolf Hilferding (and 
later adopted by other Marxist theorists of Imperialism), about the monopolistic character 
of modern capitalism (see in detail Section 5 of this paper). Indeed, in his The Sociology 
of Imperalisms (1919), he often adopted identical expressions with those of Hilferding.11  
 Closing this section, we must pose the question of whether the similar theses of 
both economists under discussion might be directly rooted in a common theoretical 
framework, i.e. in the economic theory of Karl Marx. A thorough analysis of this 
important issue takes place in Section 5. There, we will defend the thesis, that contrary to 
Marx’s approach which proceeded on the assumption that free competition is a structural 
feature of the capital relation which cannot be abolished, both Hilferding and 
Schumpeter thought of monopolies, as already discussed, as the decisive feature of the 
supposed “latest phase” of capitalism from which both innovation and growth originate. 
Finally, according to Marx’s approach, the question of whether it is big or small 
enterprises that promote technical change, is a problem which cannot be answered on the 
abstract level of analysis, but shall be situated on a more empirical level of investigation.  
 
                                                          
11 Schumpeter wrote: “Monopoly capitalism has virtually fused the big banks and cartels into one” (Schumpeter 1951: 
81). Schumpeter does not differentiate himself from Hilferding’s theory of monopoly capitalism (see Section 5), but 
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4. The Separation of Roles  
 
We may now move on to another area of Hilferding’s work that may also have influenced 
Schumpeter’s writings. Hilferding believed that the domination of big monopolistic 
enterprises in the “latest phase” of capitalism brought with it the sharp distinction 
between the entrepreneur, conceived as the head of the firm’s managerial staff, on the one 
hand, and the capitalist (owner of the enterprise or creditor) on the other. He further 
considered this separation of roles to be of fundamental economic significance for the 
“latest phase” of capitalism, as it allowed the distinction between two specific forms of 
enterprise: the dominant (big “monopolistic” enterprise), from which emerge the main 
patterns of evolution of capitalism, and the dominated (traditional individually owned 
firm). He wrote:  
“Up to the present, economics has sought to distinguish between the individually 
owned enterprise and the joint-stock company (or corporation) only in terms of 
differences in their organisational forms and of the consequences which flow directly 
from them. […B]ut it has neglected to investigate the fundamental economic differences 
between the two forms of enterprise, even though these differences are crucial to any 
understanding of modern capitalist development, which can only be comprehended in 
terms of the ascendancy of the corporation and its causes” (Hilferding 1910: 107).  
In addition, Hilferding argued that the new form of industrial corporation: 
“involves above all a change in the function of the industrial capitalist. For it 
converts what has been an occasional, accidental occurrence in the individual enterprise 
into a fundamental principle; namely, the liberation of the industrial capitalist from his 
function as industrial entrepreneur” (Hilferding 1910: 107, emphasis added). And he 
concluded: “As a result of this change the capital invested in a corporation becomes pure 
money capital as far as the capitalist is concerned. The money capitalist as creditor has 
nothing to do with the use which is made of his capital in production. […] His only 
function is to lend his capital and, after a period of time, to get it back with interest” 
(Hilferding 1910: 107).  
                                                                                                                                                                             
only from certain theses that Hilferding regarded as consequences of that theory: “I do not go along with Hilferding, 
incidentally, in anticipating that trustification will bring about a stabilization of capitalism” (Schumpeter 1951: 175). 
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It is obvious that Hilferding made a clear distinction between the entrepreneur, who 
is in charge of the use of capital in production, and the (money) capitalist who advances 
or lends his capital and bears the risk. He further considers this separation of roles to be 
an outcome of the formation of the “latest phase” of capitalism. 
This very sharp separation of roles between the capitalist and the entrepreneur in 
modern “trustified” capitalism is also at the core of Schumpeter’s approach, and has been 
commented on by many authors (e.g. Heilbroner 1998: ch. 10). 
Both Hilferding and Schumpeter conceived, thus, of the separation of roles between 
the capitalist and the entrepreneur as a major characteristic of the big corporation. 
However, they saw differently the connection of each one of these two agents with the 
corporation’s managers: While for Hilferding the entrepreneur was simply the top 
manager, closely connected with the rest of the managerial staff in promoting innovation 
and development, for Schumpeter the entrepreneur, representing the element of initiative 
and change, confronted the managers, who were mainly concerned with routine affairs 
and with the reproduction of the existing status of the corporation.  
Consequently, for Hilferding the capitalist-owner had become superfluous, an 
evolution which paved the way to socialism. He wrote:  
“Finance capital puts control over social production increasingly into the hands of a 
small number of large capitalist associations, separates the management of production 
from ownership and socializes production to the extent that this is possible under 
capitalism. […] The tendency of finance capital is to establish social control of 
production, but it is an antagonistic form of socialization, since the control of social 
production remains vested in an oligarchy [… However, this] socializing function of 
finance capital facilitates enormously the task of overcoming capitalism [...] it is enough 
for society, through its conscious executive organ – the state conquered by the working 
class – to seize finance capital in order to gain control [...] of production” (Hilferding 
1910: 367). 
On the contrary, for Schumpeter the entrepreneurs constantly renewed the capitalist 
class, as the more successful among them systematically showed the propensity of 
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becoming capitalist-owners themselves (Schumpeter 1912: 78-9).12 Only the 
bureaucratisation of the big enterprise, through the subordination of the entrepreneurs to 
managers could lead trustified capitalism to socialism: “The perfectly bureaucratized 
giant industrial unit […] ousts the entrepreneur and expropriates the bourgeoisie as a 
class which in the process stands to loose not only its income but what is infinitely more 
important, its function” (Schumpeter 1942: 134). “Thus the same process that undermines 
the position of the bourgeoisie by decreasing the importance of the functions of 
entrepreneurs and capitalists, by breaking up protective strata and institutions, by creating 
an atmosphere of hostility, also decomposes the motor forces of capitalism from within” 
(Schumpeter 1942: 161-62). 
Schumpeter defined socialism as “an institutional arrangement that vests the 
management of the productive forces with some public authority” (Schumpeter 1942: 
113), and claimed that “the modern corporation, although the product of the capitalist 
process, socializes the […] mind” (Schumpeter 1942: 156). Furthermore, he argued that 
the “bureaucratisation of economic life” is stimulated by and within the large-scale 
corporation (Schumpeter 1942: 206) and this fact allows the transition to a socialist but 
“bureaucratic apparatus” by establishing new modes of managerial responsibility and 
selection that “could only be reproduced in a socialist society” (Schumpeter 1942: 206-
7). 
In fact, a basic argument of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy is that the 
entrepreneur becomes less and less important, and consequently the process of economic 
development comes to halt and capitalism gives way to socialism. Schumpeter gave two 
reasons for the gradual disappearance of the entrepreneur:  
“For, on the one hand, it is much easier now than it has been in the past to do things 
that lie outside the familiar routine –innovation itself is being reduced to routine. 
Technological progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained 
specialists who turn out what is required and make it work unpredictable ways. The 
romance of earlier commercial venture is rapidly wearing away, because so many more 
things can be strictly calculated that had of old to be visualized in a flash of genius.  
                                                          
12 As Elliott puts it: “Schumpeter made it clear that successful entrepreneurs become capitalists (or landowners), while 
unsuccessful ones presumably become workers or managers” (Elliott 1980: 49). 
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On the other hand, personality and will power must count for less in environments 
which have become accustomed to economic change – best instanced by an incessant 
stream of new consumer’s and producer’s goods – and which, instead of resisting, accept 
it a matter of course” (Schumpeter 1942: 132).  
However, Schumpeter still stressed the importance of individual entrepreneurs, 
albeit in a different institutional setting: eg. a production/development engineer in the 
Research and Development (R&D) department of a large electrical firm could be 
regarded as an “entrepreneur” in Schumpeter’s sense of the word. Thus, Schumpeter 
despite envisaging the demise of the entrepreneurs and their partial replacement by a new 
mode of economic organization (Freeman 1982, Philips 1971), never completely 
abandoned his initial model of the entrepreneur as the agent of technological and 
economic change (te Velde 2001: 24).13 
For Schumpeter, this new mode of economic organization, “the growth of the great 
combines or the rise of trustification, is the final stage of capitalism […A]fter that, it 
would resolve itself into socialism” (te Velde 2001: 24).  
We may conclude therefore that both authors commenced from a similar theoretical 
point (i.e. separation of roles between the capitalist and the entrepreneur in the big 
enterprise of “trustified capitalism”) and arrived at a similar conclusion: the possibility of 
socialism, conceived as a system of control of the means of production by central state 
authorities.14  
However, they understood differently the “capitalist element” in the big enterprise: 
For Hilferding this element consisted in private property and had become superfluous, 
while for Schumpeter this private ownership regime necessarily entailed the entrepreneur 
                                                          
13 In the age of “perfect competitive capitalism”, which Schumpeter regarded to have come to an end, one could argue 
that the carrying out of new combinations was a low-trust affair. It could be depicted as the feat of the exceptional will-
power of a single entrepreneur. But in the era of high technology, high complexity and high dependency on other 
people, the entrepreneur must be able to “woo support” and “to negotiate with and handle men with consummate skill” 
and not only to “impress the social group [that is adjoined to the new combination]” and “educate the consumers” and 
teach them “to want things, or things which differ in some respect or other from those which have been in the habit of 
using” (Schumpeter 1912: 65). It should not come as a surprise, then, that in his later work, Schumpeter explicitly 
recognized the rise of collective entrepreneurship. “[…the] entrepreneurial function need not to be embodied in […] a 
single physical person. Every social environment has its own ways of filling the entrepreneurial function […it] may be 
and often is filled co-operatively. With the development of the largest-scale corporations this has evidently become of 
major importance: aptitudes that no single individual combines can thus be built into a corporate personality; on the 
other hand, the constituent physical personalities must inevitably to some extent, and very often to a serious extent, 
interfere with each other” (Schumpeter 1949: 260-1).     
14 It should be noted that Schumpeter made an effort to discuss the relationship between socialism and entrepreneurship 
at length in the second German edition (1926) of the Theory of Economic Development (Csontos 1987).  
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as conveyor of vision, economic novelty and innovation. In Hilferding’s view the role of 
innovation was ascribed the firm’s managerial staff, to which belonged not only the 
entrepreneur (being identified with the top-manager) but also another “personality” 
(belonging to the same managerial staff), the innovative manager, whose primary goal 
was to make new ideas work properly and accurately. This innovative manager would 
attain and further unfold his innovative role in the framework of a socially planned 
economy.  
In this line of reasoning, Hilferding concluded that a form of tension emerged 
between capitalist owners and managers, the former being only interested in short-term 
profit maximisation, the latter preferring long-run strategies based on technological 
development and innovation. He wrote:   
“The separation of capital ownership from its function also affects the management 
of the enterprise. The interest which its owners have in obtaining the largest possible 
profit as quickly as possible, their lust for booty, which slumbers in every capitalist soul, 
can be subordinated to a certain extent, by the managers of the purely technical 
requirements of production. More energetically than the private entrepreneur they will 
develop the firm’s plant, modernize obsolete installations, and engage in competition to 
open up new markets, even if the attainment of this goals entails sacrifices for the 
shareholders” (Hilferding 1910: 126).  
Schumpeter defined production as the combinations or materials and forces that are 
within our reach (Schumpeter 1942: 65). The producer is not an inventor. The basic 
driving force behind economic growth is the introduction of new combinations of 
materials and forces.   
Following Scott’s excellent formulation: “Schumpeter, emphasized the role of the 
entrepreneur in development. By definition, he is the man who sees that the new 
combination is made. He is to be distinguished from the capitalist (who bears the risk) 
and from the inventor (who has the ideas), although it is possible for one man to be all 
three” (Scott 1998: 104).  
Schumpeter incorporated the modernizing functions of Hilferding’s “innovative 
manager” to those of the entrepreneur and thus connected them with the “spirit of 
capitalism”. In other words, he ascribed the role of innovation, i.e. of introducing new 
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goods or production techniques, of opening new markets or implementing new 
organisational forms to the entrepreneur who, without being a capitalist-owner, might 
exist only in the framework of the capitalist regime of private ownership of the means of 
production. 
It is along these lines of reasoning that Schumpeter drew a sharp distinction 
between the roles of entrepreneur(s) and manager(s). More precisely, Schumpeter 
believed that “the entrepreneur is concerned with change” whereas the manager is 
“concerned with routine problems” (Scott 1998: 104). We agree with Scott (1998: 104), 
that the tension between the manager and the entrepreneur had already been stressed in 
The Theory of Economic Development:  
“Carrying out a new plan and acting according to a customary one are things as 
different as making a road and walking along it” (Schumpeter 1912: 85). “Surmounting 
this opposition is always a special kind of task which does not exist in the customary 
course of life, a task which also requires a special kind of conduct” (Schumpeter 1912: 
87). Schumpeter stressed the difference between an entrepreneur and a manager with the 
following words: “[everyone] is an entrepreneur only when he actually ‘carries out new 
combinations’, and loses that character as soon as he has built up his business, when he 
settles down to running it as other people run their businesses” (Schumpeter 1912: 78).  
Schumpeter further developed this idea of antithesis between the entrepreneur and 
the manager in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. He claimed, as already stated, that 
the bureaucratisation of the big enterprise, with the transformation of entrepreneurial 
activity into a routine process conducted by managers and technical employees, would 
lead to the petrifaction and final decline of the big enterprise and thus of the capitalist 
economic and social order. He explicitly tackled the diminishing importance of the 
entrepreneur in a chapter entitled “The Obscolescence of the Entrepreneurial Function”. 
(Schumpeter 1942, Ch. XII.). 
We will not continue this discussion any further, since Schumpeter’s contribution 
to this subject has been widely recognized and analysed. Closing this subsection, it is 
important to stress again here that the conceptualisation of the separation of roles 
between the capitalist, the entrepreneur and the managers seems to have been developed 
by Schumpeter in close connection with his idea of the supremacy of the large 
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oligopolistic corporation. In other words, the separation of roles is considered to be an 
outcome of the prevailing type of firm structure and entrepreneurial activity. We argue 
that this conception traces its roots back to Hilferding, who first presented the “liberation 
of the industrial capitalist from his function as industrial entrepreneur” (Hilferding 1910: 
107) as an outcome of the formation of the “latest phase” of capitalism, characterized by 
the predominance of monopolistic enterprises. However, Schumpeter elaborated on the 
idea of antithesis between the entrepreneur and the manager, and in this framework 
tended to incorporate the functions of Hilferding’s “innovative manager” into the role of 
the entrepreneur himself.  
Schumpeter was realist enough to see that the carrying out of new combinations 
involves a lot more than “an act of will”; command over the means of production is 
necessary (te Velde 2001: 7). In most cases the entrepreneur has to resort to credit, 
especially since new ventures do not have revenues from previous years. Consequently, if 
someone wants to function as entrepreneur, he must raise funds. The provision of credit, 
as discussed, comes from another personality, the capitalist. The capitalist may, of 
course, use funds which are themselves the result of successful innovation and 
entrepreneurial profit (Schumpeter 1912: 72). 
The capitalist bears the financial risk (the entrepreneur risks his job and his 
reputation) and, because capital utilization is nothing but the diversion of the factors of 
production to new uses (Schumpeter 1912: 116), the capitalist has some power to dictate 
new directions to production (te Velde 2001: 7).   
In his Theory of Economic Development (1912) Schumpeter began with the 
description of a market based circular flow of economic activity and in this context 
defined economic development as a  phenomenon “entirely foreign to what maybe 
observed in the circular flow or in the tendency toward equilibrium”. It is a “spontaneous 
and discontinuous change in the channels of the flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which 
forever alters and displaces the equilibrium state previously existing” (Schumpeter 1912: 
64). Continuously, the great Austrian economist pointed out that “the ‘new combination 
of means of production’ and credit” were the “fundamental phenomena of economic 
development” (Schumpeter 1911: 74).  
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Schumpeter stressed the importance “of credit means of payment created ad-hoc, 
which can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in 
existence” (Schumpeter 1912: 106). In this manner, credit performs the functions of 
“enabling the entrepreneur to withdrawn producers’ goods which he needs from their 
previous employments, by exercising a demand for them, and thereby to force the 
economic system into new channels” (Schumpeter 1912: 106). 
According to Schumpeter’s analysis, credit provides the entrepreneur with an 
additional purchasing power that enables him to foster development “in a system with 
private property and division of labor. By credit, entrepreneurs are given access to the 
social stream of goods before they have acquired the normal claim to it […] Granting 
credit in this sense operates as an order on the economic system to accommodate itself to 
the purposes of the entrepreneur, as an order on the goods, which he needs: it means 
entrusting him with productive forces. It is only thus that economic development could 
arise from the mere circular flow in perfect equilibrium. And this function constitutes the 
keystone of the modern credit structure”. (Schumpeter 1912: 107).  
Following Fritz and Haulman: “Thus, for Schumpeter it is new credit creation that 
is a key to growth and development. It does not matter whether the situation involves the 
emergence of a new financial structure which allows new credit creation to occur or 
whether the new credit creation takes place within an existing financial structure. What is 
important is that new credit creation takes place” (Fritz and Haulman 1987: 117, 
emphasis added).   
Hilferding also emphasized, in his analysis of “credit money”, the crucial role of 
banks in the development of capitalism (Fritz and Haulman 1987). However, where 
Hilferding presented an indictment of capitalism, Schumpeter found considerable 
strength.  
At first, Hilferding differentiated between paper money as legal tender “which 
emerges from circulation as a social product”, and credit money which is a “private 
affair”, not backed by the government (Hilferding 1910: 66). In this last case, money can 
be replaced by a promise to pay. The development of the capitalist system is followed by 
a rapid increase in the total volume of commodities in circulation and thus “of the 
socially necessary value in circulation. [...] Further the expansion of production, the 
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conversion of all obligations into monetary obligations, and especially the growth of 
fictitious capital, have been accompanied by an increase in the extent to which 
transactions are concluded with credit money”. So Hilferding concluded that credit 
money required “special institutions where obligations can be cancelled out and the 
residual balances settled, and as such institutions develop so is a greater economy 
achieved” (Hilferding 1910: 66). And this was seen as a fundamental function of any 
developed banking system.    
According to Hilferding’s analysis of “credit money” in Finance Capital, credit 
originated as a consequence of the changed function of money as a means of payment. A 
purchase not followed by direct payment, i.e. a delay in payment “means that one 
capitalist has enough surplus capital to wait for payment for the purchaser, the money due 
is credited” and “money is […] merely transferred” (Hilferding 1910: 82).    
However, when a promissory note functions as a means of payment, money 
capital has been saved, and this type of credit is called “circulation credit” (Hilferding 
1910: 83). According to Hilferding, this credit form increases transactions between 
(productive) capitalists and so an increased demand for production capital emerges, 
which constitutes a presupposition for capital accumulation. He pointed out that: “Credit 
which is thus based upon release of money capital is radically different from the 
commercial credit which originates only from the changed function of money in simple 
commodity circulation” (Hilferding 1910: 81).  
He believed that an increase in production means a simultaneous expansion of 
circulation and “the enlarged circulation process is made possible through an increase in 
the quantity of credit money” (Hilferding 1910: 83).  
However, circulation credit, does not “transfer money capital from one productive 
capitalist to another; nor does it transfer money from other (unproductive) classes to the 
capitalist class” (Hilferding 1910: 87). This role is played by another form of credit, 
which converts idle money into active money capital, and is called “capital credit”. This 
credit form constitutes a transfer of money to those who use it as money capital, i.e. for 
the purpose of purchasing the elements of productive capital. 
Conclusively, credit “puts money into circulation as money capital in order to 
convert it into productive capital” (Hilferding 1910: 88). This expands the scale of 
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production with the simultaneous expansion of circulation. Thus, the scale of circulation 
is enlarged by utilization of previously idle money. 
In this context Hilferding emphasized the need for an economic institution which 
will collect idle money capital and then distribute it to productive capitalists. Banks offer 
the ideal means for exercising this function of credit. They make payments, they converse 
idle money into active money capital; they collect idle money from other classes and 
make it available to capitalists as money capital (Hilferding 1910: 90). He wrote: “With 
the development of the banking system, as unemployed money flows into the banks, bank 
credit is substituted for commercial credit, so that increasingly all bills serve as means of 
payment not in the original in which they circulate among productive capitalists, but in 
their converted form as bank notes” (Hilferding 1910: 86). 
Banks offer the institutional framework in which to exercise the functions of 
credit. However, Hilferding concluded that the banking system is the major instrument of 
trustification, as it generates tendencies toward fusion and concentration of banking and 
industrial capital in the form of finance capital: “The concentration of industry is the 
ultimate cause of concentration of the banking system” (Hilferding 1910: 98). Hence, he 
attacked the system of “latest” capitalism, in which banking and bankers play a critical 
role in increasing monopoly market power. He summarized:  
“An ever-increasing part of industrial capital does not belong to the industrialists 
who use it. They get the disposition of it only through the banks, which represent the 
owners of it. On the other hand, the bank must invest an ever-increasing part of its capital 
in industry. Thus the bank becomes, to an ever-greater extent, an industrial capitalist. 
This bank capital, or capital in the form of money, which in this way has in reality been 
transformed into industrial capital, I shall call finance capital […] an ever larger part of 
capital used in industry is finance capital – capital disposed of by the banks and used by 
the industrialists” (Hilferding 1910: 283). 
The above presentation of the main tenets of Schumpeter’s and Hilferding’s 
approaches to credit may justify the argument stated by Fritz and Haulman (1987: 126, 
emphasis added), that “Hilferding’s emphasis on capital credit is the forerunner of 
Schumpeter’s […] credit”. The main point behind this argument is that both authors 
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stressed the idea that “the key characteristic of development lies in the financial system’s 
ability to mobilize capital credit” (Fritz and Haulman 1987: 126).  
Although we agree with this point, we still think that the two theoreticians’ views 
on the nature of credit seem to diverge significantly: Schumpeter adopted a more 
“endogenous” approach to money and credit (“means of payment created ad-hoc, which 
can be backed neither by money in the strict sense nor by products already in existence”; 
Schumpeter 1912: 106, i.e. “new credit creation”), while Hilferding adopted a more 
traditional or Classical approach, regarding credit rather as substitute for the value of 
existing commodities or of “commodity money” (and in this sense as conversion of 
already existing “idle money” into “active money capital”). 
Closing this section, we may say that ideas and elaborations regarding the 
connection of Schumpeter’s understanding of credit with other classic works of Marxist 
literature (including, of course, Marx’s Capital and Hilferding’s Finance Capital), 
would, obviously, be of great interest especially for promoting dialogue between different 
Schools of economic thought (in particular Schumpeterian and Marxian economics), and 
for understanding current economic issues. Thus, an issue that is extraneous, in strict 
terms, to the subject of the present paper, i.e. the potential Marxian influences behind 
Schumpeter’s theory of credit, could be a good example for future investigation and 
dialogue between Schumpeterian and Marxian political economy.15 
Up to this point we have emphasized the affinity between Hilferding’s and 
Schumpeter’s analyses regarding the role of the big enterprise in economic development, 
the tendency towards trustification of the capitalist economy and the separation of roles 
between capitalists, entrepreneurs and managers. In the next Section we are going to 
investigate wether these ideas are directly rooted in the writings of Karl Marx, or whether 
under concern is a unique interpretation of Marx’s theory, originally put forward by 
Hilferding, which has also influenced Schumpeter. 
 Thus, as far as the question of whether the theses of both Schumpeter and 
Hilferding could be directly rooted in the theory of Karl Marx is concerned, in the next 
section we will attempt to show, that while Marx put emphasis on the separation of roles 
                                                          
15 The question of credit and money “endogeneity” was posited and discussed in the framework of nearly all major 
non-Neoclassical Schools of Political Economy: The Classic (Thomas Tooke and the Banking – Currency debate, see 
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between the legal owner and the directing agents of enterprises (entrepreneur or top 
manager), thus favouring conceptualisations that comprehend all these categories of 
economic agents as constituent parts of the bourgeoisie, Schumpeter, as discussed, 
seemed again to move along the theoretical path opened by Hilferding’s interpretation of 
Marx’s theory. 
 
5. Hilferding’s and Schumpeter’s “microeconomic” vis-à-vis Marx’s     
    “macroeconomic” approach 
 
In this section we will explore the question of whether the theses of both economists 
under discussion are rooted in a common theoretical framework, more precisely, in the 
economic theory of Karl Marx. On the one hand, Hilferding was a major Marxist 
theoretician of his time, while on the other, as Ricardo Bellofiore has argued, 
“Schumpeter’s legacy may be summarized through a comparison with Marx” (Bellofiore 
1998: 1009).16 If the similarities of their approaches to the issues of market structure and 
technological progress on the one hand, and to the separation of roles between capitalist 
and entrepreneur on the other, are the result of unfolding certain Marxian theses, analyses 
or ideas, then the first impression that Hilferding might have influenced Schumpeter 
could be wrong: Both economists might have come to similar conclusions because they 
had commenced, independently, from the same theoretical point of departure, i.e. 
Marxian theory. 
  In what follows we will argue against the above hypothesis: Our main argument 
will be that the theoretical system developed by Hilferding and first introduced with his 
Finance Capital, which Schumpeter seems to have followed at certain points of his work, 
bears the character of a “revision” rather than of a further development or “actualisation” 
of Marx’s theoretical analysis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Rubin 1989), the Keynesian and Postkeynesian (see Moore 1988: 207 ff), the Marxian School (see Milios 2002, Milios 
2005). 
16 Other authors are even more affirmative on the issue of Marx’s influence on Schumpeter. According to Catephores 
for example, this influence “cannot possibly be gainsaid; it bursts through the seams of virtually everything he wrote. 
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5.1 The Marxian Theory and the Notion of “Social Capital”  
 
Marx developed his economic theory, under the rubric of A Critique of Political 
Economy, mainly in the period 1857-1867. It is a well-defined system, structured as a 
logical array of original concepts and analyses based on Marx’s notions of value and 
surplus value.17 
  Concerning Marx’s value theory, it must first of all made clear that, according to 
Marx, this theory does not have as its object of study any specific capitalist country or 
“historical form” (“historical stage”) of capitalism, but the Capitalist Mode of Production 
(C.M.P.), i.e. the structural elements of the capitalist system as such, irrespective of its 
specific forms of historical appearance18 or its level of development (see Althusser et al. 
1965, Milios et al. 2002).  
Before we proceed any further, it should be noted that Marxism has since its 
beginnings taken the form of various (Marxist) trends and schools of thought, which are 
based on contradictory theoretical principles, positions and deductions (see e.g. Howard 
and King 1989, Milios 1995). 
However, both Hilferding in his early writings (1904) and Schumpeter adopted a 
“mainstream” interpretation of value theory, which we have elsewhere defined as 
“Ricardian Marxism” or the “Classic version” of value theory (see Milios et al. 2002, 
Milios 2005). This version incorporates into Marxist theory the viewpoint of the 
Classical School of Political Economy on value as “labour expended”: according to it, the 
value of each commodity is determined independently, and is commensurable 
(qualitatively identical) with price (i.e. belongs to the category of empirically tangible 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nor did he ever attempt to deny the influence of Marx on his work, belittle his debt to or in any way conceal his vast 
admiration for the author of Capital” (Catephores 1994: 4). 
17 Marx’s mature economic writings contain the following works: the Manuscripts 1857-58, (first published in 1939-41 
as Grundrisse, Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, MEGA II, 1.1); A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy (first published 1859, MEGA II, 1.2); the Manuscript 1861-63 (comprising nearly 2,500 printed 
pages –MEGA II, 3.1-3.6, a part of which was published during the period 1905-10 under the title Theories of Surplus 
Value); the Manuscripts 1863-67 (containing all drafts of the three volumes of Capital. A Critique of Political 
Economy –MEGA II, 4.1 and 4.2); and Volume one of Capital (first published in 1867 –MEGA II, 5). In the second 
(1872-73) edition of Volume one of Capital, Marx revised Part one of the book, entitled “Commodities and Money”. 
Volumes two and three of Capital were edited and published by Engels in 1885 and 1894 respectively. 
18 As Marx himself noted in the Preface to the first edition of Vol. 1 of Capital: “What I have to examine in this work 
is the capitalist mode of production, and the relations of production and forms of intercourse that correspond to it” 
(Marx 1867: 90); and in Volume 3 of Capital he stated: “we are only out to present the internal organization of the 
capitalist mode of production, its ideal average” (Marx 1894: 970).  
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quantities).19 Consequently, value can be reduced to (production) price by means of 
mathematical calculation.20 
Most important for our analysis is the fact that, despite different interpretations of 
Marx’s economic analysis, all versions of Marxism until the publication of Finance 
Capital accepted an identical point of view concerning the relationship between the 
capitalist economy as a whole and the individual enterprise. This point of view was based 
on theses explicitly formulated by Marx, which shaped a fundamentally 
“macroeconomic” approach to the capitalist economy. According to it, the immanent 
causal regularities (“laws”) of the capitalist system stand at the level of the capitalist 
economy as a whole and are thereof imposed as “motives” on the individual constituent 
elements of this economy.  
As Marx clearly noted: “the immanent laws of capitalist production manifest 
themselves in the external movement of the individual capitals” and “assert themselves as 
the coercive laws of competition, and therefore enter into the consciousness of the 
                                                          
19 According to our understanding of Marxian value theory (Milios et al 2002; see also for a converging approach 
Heinrich 1999, Arthur 2002), Marx’s theory of value constitutes not a “modification” or a “correction” of Classical 
Political Economy’s theory of value, but a new theoretical domain, shaping thus a new theoretical object of analysis. 
Marx’s notion of value does not coincide with Ricardo’s concept of value as “labour expended”, but it constitutes a 
complex notion, a theoretical “junction” which allows the deciphering of the capital relation, by combining the 
specifically capitalist features of the labour process with the corresponding forms of appearance of the products of 
labour. In this way, value becomes an expression of the capital relation and of the Capitalist Mode of Production 
(C.M.P.), i.e. of the structural elements shaping the capitalist relations of production in general, independently of any 
temporal or spatial peculiarities (historical era, “phase”, geographical region or country, see above). In Marx’s 
theoretical system, money constitutes the only form of appearance of value. Value is determined, of course, by 
“abstract labour”, i.e. by capitalistically expended labour (labour process for-the-exchange and for-profit); however, 
abstract labour does not constitute an empirical magnitude, which could be measured by the stopwatch. It is an 
abstraction, which acquires a tangible existence only in the process of exchange, in the commodity’s price. The 
essential feature of the “market economy” (of capitalism) is thus not simply commodity exchange (as maintained by 
mainstream theories) but monetary circulation and money. The Marxian analysis holds that exchange is necessarily 
mediated by money. In Marx’s theory both value and money are concepts, which cannot be defined independently of 
the notion of capital. In summary, value and price are not commensurable quantities, but they belong to different levels 
of abstraction. In Marx’s system, value is the notion, which deciphers prices, shows what prices are, without 
determining their exact level. Values as such cannot be measured quantitatively, and it is even more impossible to refer 
to the level of any value at all as such, taken in isolation. With Marx’s words: “Value can only manifest itself in the 
social relation of commodity to commodity” (Marx 1867: 138-39). 
20 Analytically, Hilferding (1904) defended the main thesis of “Ricardian Marxism”, namely the commensurability 
between value and price, as follows: “we have commensurability, inasmuch as prices and values are both expressions 
for different quantities of labour […] they are qualitatively homogeneous” (Hilferding 1904: 161), while Schumpeter 
explicitly expressed the view that “Marx must be considered a ‘classic’ economist and more specifically a member of 
the Ricardian group” (Schumpeter 1954: 390). However, while Schumpeter rejected this (considered as the Marxian) 
value theory, Hilferding initially praised it. For example, Schumpeter (1942: 23n) wrote that Marx “was under the same 
delusion as Aristotle, viz., that value, though a factor in the determination of relative prices, is yet something that is 
different from, and exists independently of, relative prices or exchange relations. The proposition that the value of a 
commodity is the amount of labour embodied in it can hardly mean anything else”. On the other hand Hilferding wrote: 
“The law of value is not cancelled by the data of the third volume [of Capital], but is merely modified in a definite 
way” (Hilferding 1904: 157). 
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individual capitalist as the motives which drive him forward” (Marx 1867: 433; emphasis 
added).21 
The notion that corresponds to the overall causal relationships of capitalist 
production is, according to Marx, social capital (Gesamtkapital). In another formulation, 
the immanent causal relationships governing the capitalist economy transform the totality 
of enterprises (“individual capitals”, according to Marx’s terminology) into elements of 
social capital, i.e. they situate them within an economic system, which then exercises a 
conditioning influence on them. 
  It is in this way, according to Marx, that capital constitutes a historically specific 
social relation of exploitation and domination.22 Social capital is thus the concept of 
capital at the level of the capitalist economy as a whole, i.e. it is the complex concept 
embracing empirically detectable regularities of a capitalist economy, but also all the 
“laws” – the hidden causal determinants – of the capitalist system. Embodied in the 
structural framework of social capital, the individual “capitalist is simply personified 
capital, functioning in the production process simply as the bearer of capital” (Marx 
1894: 958). He/she is not the subject of initiative and change; he/she is subjected to the 
laws of evolution and change of social capital, imposed as motives to his/her 
consciousness through competition. 
  
5.2 Free Competition and Monopolies in the Capitalist Mode of Production  
 
We will focus now on the issue of free competition, as it allows a deep insight into 
matters of causality and into the content of notions such as monopolies and technical 
change in Marx’s and Hilferding’s respective theoretical systems.23  
  As already stated, according to Marx free competition ensures the reciprocal 
engagement, peculiar to the capitalist system, of institutionally independent production 
units, imposing on the respective capitals the laws of capitalist production. Competition 
                                                          
21 What is valid for the individual enterprise is much more valid for the persons who man this enterprise (the 
entrepreneur, the managers…): “My analytic method […] does not proceed from man but from a given economic 
period of society” (Marx-Internet 1881). “Individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications 
of economic categories, the bearers of particular class-relations and interests” (Marx 1867: 92). “Marxism 
comprehends society as a system without subjects” (Bucharin 1926: 227). 
22 This relation manifests itself, in the first instance, in the commodity character of the economy, in the general 
exchangeability (through money) of the products of labour on the market. 
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makes it possible for the separate capitalist enterprises, the individual capitals, to 
constitute themselves and function as social capital. Through their structural 
interdependence, that is to say their organization as social capital, the individual capitals 
proclaim themselves a social class: they function as a uniform social force which 
counterposes itself to, and dominates, labour (see Milios 2000: 289-98). 
  As individual capitals, enterprises are intended to maximize their profit. This 
tendency is however, through free competition, subordinated to the laws inherent in the 
concept of social capital, and more specifically to the process of equalisation of the rate 
of profit and the formation of a tendentially average profit. The tendency towards 
equalisation of the rate of profit is thus a structural characteristic of the capitalist 
relation as such. 
  This tendency is related to two processes: 
  a) Competition within each branch or sector of production, which in principle 
ensures for each commodity the “establishment of a uniform market value and market 
price” (Marx 1894: 281). Competition within each branch of production therefore tends 
in every instance to impose on all the individual capitals the more productive 
manufacturing techniques and in this way to equalize the rate of profit within each 
branch. 
 b) Competition at the level of overall capitalist production, which ensures such 
mobility of capital from one branch to another that a uniform rate of profit tends to 
emerge for the entire capitalist economy (the general rate of profit). The shaping of the 
uniform general rate of profit is achieved on the basis of production prices. These are, in 
other words, precisely those prices for the product of each individual capital that 
guarantee it a rate of profit (= ratio of the total profit for a certain period of production to 
the total capital advanced) equal to (tending towards equality with) the general rate of 
profit in the economy.  
 “Freedom of capital”, its concentration and centralisation and its capacity to move 
from one sphere of production to another – mobility facilitated by the credit system and 
necessitated by competition, because every individual capital seeks employment where it 
can achieve the highest rate of profit – are the terms which secure the predominance of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 For an interesting presentation of Marx’s and Hilferding’s related theses see Kyung-Mi Kim (1999). 
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the tendency towards equalisation of the rate of profit. It is according to this theoretical 
reasoning that “[T]he predominance of capital is the presupposition of free competition” 
(Marx 1857-58: 651)24 and free competition shall be regarded as an indispensable feature 
of the C.M.P.  
   As argued in Section 3, by introducing the idea of “the elimination of free 
competition among individual capitalists by the large monopolistic combines” 
(Hilferding 1910: 301), Hilferding substitutes Marx’s macroeconomic view with a 
“microeconomic” approach, according to which the characteristics of the “dominant 
form” of enterprise (individual capital) shape the whole capitalist system (the social 
capital) and determine its patterns of evolution and change. What we have here is an 
inversion of the flow of cause and effect in the relationship between social capital and 
individual capital, which constitutes a paradigm shift within Marxian economic theory.  
 Opposite to Soviet Marxists and other descendants of his theory of “monopoly 
capitalism”, Hilferding himself was frank enough to admit that his approach was not 
compatible with Marx’s value theory: “It seems that the monopolistic combine, while it 
confirms Marx’s theory of concentration, at the same time tends to undermine his theory 
of value” (Hilferding 1910: 228, emphasis added). 
  The above conclusion concerning the paradigm shift introduced in Marxist 
economic theory by Hilferding’s Finance Capital may be further elucidated on the basis 
of Marx’s monopoly theory in the 3rd Volume of Capital. This theory is explicitly 
formulated by Marx, contrary to the belief that monopolies can be studied only in the 
framework of the “latest phase” of capitalism, which was supposedly formed only after 
Marx’s death. 
 Marx’s theses can be summarized as follows: 
                                                          
24 As Marx put it: “Free competition is the relation of capital to itself as another capital, i.e. the real conduct of capital 
as capital. The inner laws of capital – which appear merely as tendencies in the preliminary historic stages of its 
development – are for the first time posited as laws; production founded on capital for the first time posits itself in the 
forms adequate to it only in so far as and to the extent that free competition develops, for it is the free development of 
the mode of production founded on capital; the free development of its conditions and of itself as the process which 
constantly reproduces these conditions. It is not individuals who are set free by free competition; it is, rather, capital 
which is set free. [F]ree competition is the real development of capital. By its means, what corresponds to the nature of 
capital is posited as external necessity for the individual capital; what corresponds to the concept of capital, is posited 
as external necessity for the mode of production founded on capital […] is the free, at the same time the real 
development of wealth as capital. [T]he predominance of capital is the presupposition of free competition, just as the 
despotism of the Roman Caesars was the presupposition of the free Roman ‘private law’” (Marx 1857-58: 650-1). 
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 The fact that there is a tendency towards equalisation of the rate of profit, that 
causes individual capitals to constitute themselves as social capital, does not mean that at 
any given moment the rates of profit of different individual capitals will automatically be 
equal.25 
  Monopoly was thus defined in Marx’s theory as an individual capital which 
systematically earns an above average (“extra”) rate of profit (and not as a company 
which monopolizes the market). Monopoly is accordingly not the polar opposite of free 
competition. It is a form of individual capital, which is created precisely within the 
framework of free competition: not outside and/or alongside free competition but 
through free competition and in the framework of its function.  
 Marx in Capital draws a distinction between two major types of monopoly: natural 
and artificial monopolies (see Varga 1974: 117). 
 Natural monopolies arise from monopolistic possession of the elements of 
production in their natural form, which leads to increased productivity (in relation to the 
social average) and increased (monopoly) profit (Marx 1894: 784-5). 
Artificial monopolies also establish their monopoly status on the basis of conditions 
of labour productivity higher than the social average within a certain branch of 
production. However, in this case the higher-than-average productivity derives not from 
monopolisation of a natural resource but from the technological superiority of the 
specific individual capital in relation to average conditions in its own specialized branch 
of production. This technological superiority is reflected in above average profit rates. 
 More precisely, artificial monopoly is created when an individual capital is able, 
through its technological superiority, to keep the production costs of the commodities it 
produces lower than their average production costs, which are determined at the level of 
the economy (or the economic sector) as a whole.26 
                                                          
25 On the contrary, the possibility of some inequalities in the rate of profit being reproduced may be discerned, albeit 
within the context of the tendency toward equalisation of the rate of profit, and not invalidating such a tendency: “With 
the whole of capitalist production, it is always only in a very intricate and approximate way, as an average of perpetual 
fluctuations which can never be firmly fixed, that the general law prevails as the dominant tendency” (Marx 1894: 
266). 
26 Marx wrote: “The individual value of these articles is now below their social value; […] the real value of a 
commodity, however, is not its individual, but its social value; […] [The] capitalist who applies the new method sells 
his commodity at its social value […] and thus realizes an extra surplus value” (Marx 1867: 434).  
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  It is crucial to note at this point, that according to Marx’s analysis, and contrary to 
Hilferding’s and Schumpeter’s approaches, all monopolies must be short-lived, as extra 
profit always vanishes in competition: the extra profit enjoyed by an artificial monopoly 
“acting as a coercive law of competition, forces his competitors to adopt the new method 
[of production]” (Marx 1867: 436). Artificial monopoly is thus brought into existence 
through free competition and abides in the midst of it, although at the same time its 
monopoly position is under continual threat from competition. The same is true of natural 
monopoly, given that its superiority in productivity, which derives from monopolisation 
of a natural resource by the specific individual capital, may very well be forfeited as a 
result of technical innovations introduced by its competitors.  
 We may conclude, therefore, that both monopoly forms only temporarily prevent 
the entrance of new enterprises in a specific branch: as extra profits (which characterize 
any monopoly) function as incentive to technical innovation and cost squeeze for other 
individual capitals, the tendency towards the generalization of the most productive 
techniques prevails.27 According to Marx, free competition cannot be abolished.28 
It follows from the above that monopoly profit cannot be the predominant 
characteristic of the capitalist mode of production. The predominance of the tendency 
towards equalisation of the general rate of profit is the social condition that ensures the 
self-organization of individual capitals into a ruling capitalist class: “The various 
different capitals here are in the position of shareholders in a joint-stock company” (Marx 
1894: 258). “This is the form in which capital becomes conscious of itself as a social 
power, in which every capitalist participates in proportion to his share in the total social 
capital” (Marx 1894: 279).  
Contrary to Marx’s approach, both Hilferding and Schumpeter considered 
monopolies to be a permanent characteristic of modern capitalism; much more, they both 
thought of monopolies as the decisive feature of this “latest phase” of capitalism (from 
which both innovation and growth originate). Schumpeter, after adopting a non-
                                                          
27 “This constant migration, the distribution of capital between the different spheres according to where the profit rate 
is rising and where it is falling, is what produces a relationship between supply and demand such that the average profit 
is the same in the various different spheres” (Marx 1894: 297). 
28 Marx referred also to a third type of monopoly, which may come into existence, this time in the sphere not of 
production but of circulation of commodities (the market). He named this type of monopoly the accidental monopoly. 
The term is applied to certain individual capitals, which are able to secure extra profit by exploiting conjunctural or 
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neoclassical definition of monopoly, which converges with that of Marx,29 summarized 
his main thesis as follows: “The large-scale establishment or unit of control must be 
accepted as a necessary evil inseparable from the economic progress which it is 
prevented from sabotaging by the forces inherent in its productive apparatus” 
(Schumpeter 1942: 106, emphasis added). 
 At this point we may recapitulate:  
 Marx’s theory proceeded on the assumption that free competition is a structural 
feature of the capital relation, which clearly cannot be abolished. Contrary to Rudolf 
Hilferding (and Schumpeter), for Marx the development of capitalism can be associated 
only with the evolution, not with the abolition, of free competition. Social capital is not 
the sum of the individual capitals. It is the social predominance of the capital relation, 
which is secured and elaborated in its adequate forms by means of the equalizing 
processes imposed by free capitalist competition.30 In this theoretical framework, 
monopolies can exist only as rather short-lived forms of individual capital, of secondary 
significance. It was Rudolf Hilferding in Finance Capital who first elaborated on the idea 
of a “monopoly supremacy” and a supposed antithesis between free competition and 
monopoly, a view which became the central tenet of all theories of “monopoly 
capitalism”, and which can, as shown, be found in Schumpeter’s analyses, as well.31  
 Our main argument is that this supposed antithesis evokes an empirically verifiable 
phenomenon, the tendency towards concentration and centralisation of capital and the 
establishment of very large corporations, but gives no sign of being able to comprehend 
this phenomenon in accordance with Marx’s theoretical system as it was developed in 
Capital. It does not take into account that while monopoly pertains, according to Marx’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
more permanent imbalances and fluctuations of supply and demand in the market (Marx 1894: 297). However, these 
imbalances are once more considered by Marx to be of restricted significance and duration. 
29 “When talking about monopolists [w]e mean only those single sellers whose markets are not open to the intrusion of 
would-be producers of the same commodity and of actual producers of similar ones” (Schumpeter 1942: 99). 
30 On this point Marx is unequivocal: “Capital arrives at this equalisation [of the general rate of profit] to a greater or 
lesser extent, according to how advanced capitalist development is in a given national society: i.e. the more the 
conditions in the country in question are adapted to the capitalist mode of production” (Marx 1894: 297). 
31 Schumpeter praised Hilferding’s main theses on monopolies as the result of “elimination of competition” and the 
formation of a “latest phase” of capitalism with the following remark: “Whatever may be thought of the rather old-
fashioned monetary theory of the first chapter and the monetary theory of crises of the fourth [Schumpeter actually 
means the 1st and 4th Parts of Finance Capital], its central thesis […] is interesting and original” (Schumpeter 1954: 
881). The Parts of Finance Capital are entitled as follows: Part I: Money and credit; Part II: The mobilisation of 
capital. Fictitious capital; Part III: Finance capital and the restriction of free competition; Part IV: Finance capital and 
crises; Part V: The economic policy of finance capital. 
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theoretical system, to the category of individual capital – denoting an enterprise which on 
account of its peculiar position in the capitalist production process temporarily earns 
higher-than-average profit – free competition by contrast relates exclusively to the 
category of social capital and is the pre-eminent condition for “the equalization of the 
general rate of profit” (Marx 1894, Ch. 10: 273-306) and thus integration of individual 
capitals into social capital.  
 In what follows we will demonstrate that Marx’s sharp conceptual distinction 
between “social capital” on the one hand and “individual capital” on the other, has as 
consequence a very different comprehension of the motive force of technical change and 
of the separation of roles in the capitalist enterprise than that adopted by either Hilferding 
or Schumpeter. 
 
5.3 The Question of Innovation and Technical Change according to Marx 
 
As can be inferred from the above analysis, technical change and innovation are 
considered in Marx’s macroeconomic perspective to emerge from the regularities 
determining the capitalist system as a whole, i.e. from the trends regulating the expanded 
reproduction of social capital: Innovation and technical change are the main means of 
increasing labour productivity and “no less than other socio-economic activities, were 
best analysed as social processes […] the focus of Marx’s discussion of technology and 
innovation is […] upon a collective, social process” (Rosenberg 1982: 35).  Marx himself 
wrote that: “A critical history of technology would show how little any of the inventions 
of eighteenth century are the work of a single individual” (Marx 1867: 493). 
Consequently, production relations per se impose on all individual capitals the 
urge towards innovation and technical change. Capitalism cannot be technologically 
static. Continuous innovation ensures on the one hand the increase in the rate of 
exploitation of labour by capital – and thus may raise the rate of profit – (what Marx 
describes, in Vol. 1 of Capital as “production of relative surplus-value”), while on the 
other it is the means par excellence for improving the individual enterprise’s position vis-
à-vis its competitors.  
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 As Marx explicitly stated: “Apart from certain extraneous factors […], the tendency 
and the result of the capitalist mode of production is steadily to increase the productivity 
of labour, hence continuously to increase the amount of the means of production 
converted into products with the same additional labour” (Marx 1867: 959). 
“Productivity of labour in general = the maximum of profit with the minimum of work, 
hence, too, goods constantly become cheaper. This becomes a law, independent of the 
will of the individual capitalist” (Marx 1867: 1037; emphasis added). 
It is apparent that Schumpeter drew from Marx some hints for his own theory of 
“creative destruction”32 and his explanation of extra profit, which is partly contained 
here: The innovation creates a disequilibrium in the market, which enables the extraction 
from the sale of the product of a “rent” over and above the normal rate of profit, as long 
as the monopoly position of some new method is maintained.  
 The idea that the introduction of new techniques generates an extra surplus was 
first developed in the framework of the Marxian labour theory of value. Marx stressed the 
fact that new technologies enabled the individual capitalist who first introduced them to 
enjoy extra profit.  However, Marx emphatically insisted that these extra profits are 
always short-lived, as competition soon leads to the diffusion of technological progress 
in the whole economy:   
“No capitalist voluntarily applies a new method of production […] if it reduces 
the rate of profit. But every new method of production of this kind makes commodities 
cheaper. At first, therefore he can sell them above their price of production […]. He 
pockets the difference between their costs of production and the market price of the other 
commodities, which are produced at higher production costs. […]. His production 
procedure is ahead of the social average. But competition makes the new procedure 
universal and subjects it to the general law” (Marx 1894: 373-4, emphasis added). 
Contrary to this approach, Hilferding and Schumpeter defended the thesis that 
high (monopolistic) profits, over and above the average rate of profit, are being 
constantly maintained, exactly due to the prevalence of monopolies in capitalist 
economies: “Perfect competition would prevent or immediately eliminate such surplus 
                                                          
32 “Capitalism […] is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary 
[…] revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new 
one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism” (Schumpeter 1942: 82-83). 
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profits […] But since in the process of capitalist evolution these profits acquire new 
organic functions […] that fact cannot any longer be unconditionally credited to the 
account of the perfectly competitive model” (Schumpeter 1942: 105). 
For Marx the monopolization of an advanced technique is an “exception”, which 
soon sets in motion the process of generalization of innovation and technical progress. 
For Schumpeter (who seems to follow Hilferding’s paradigm) it is the rule: The 
“microeconomic” perspective (the monopolistic enterprise and “the forces inherent in its 
productive apparatus” [Schumpeter 1942: 106]) replaces the Marxian “macroeconomic” 
perspective (the dynamics of social capital, which function as “coercive laws of 
competition, and therefore enter into the consciousness of the individual capitalist as the 
motives which drive him forward” [Marx 1867: 433]).   
Let us now turn to the consequences that each point of view has in concern with 
the question of “who is the vehicle of technological progress”. Hilferding’s and 
Schumpeter’s approach allows only one answer, as already discussed: the monopolistic 
enterprise is “the most powerful engine of that progress and in particular of the long-run 
expansion of total output” (Schumpeter 1942: 106). This monopolistic enterprise is 
considered to be the causal factor of evolution (or “creative destruction”) in the “latest 
phase” of capitalism.33  
Things are much more complex with Marx’s approach: From the above-presented 
abstract level of Marxian analysis of the structural interconnections of capitalism in 
general, i.e. from the level of social capital and the C.M.P, one may move then to lower 
levels of abstraction, i.e. to more concrete objects of investigation, regarding specific 
capitalist societies, at certain economic (or political) conjunctures etc. It is at this lower 
level of abstraction that the question may be posited, as to which sector of capital takes 
the lead of innovation and technical progress at a given concrete situation.  
In other words, according to Marx’s approach, and contrarily to Schumpeter (who 
seems to follow Hilferding’s Hypothesis), the question of whether it is the big or the 
small enterprise that promotes technical change, is a problem which cannot be answered 
on the abstract-general level of analysis, since it is situated on a lower, more empirical 
                                                          
33 Schumpeter (1942) brought this idea to its logical limits, when he claimed that the “bureaucratization” of the big 
enterprise would lead the whole capitalist system to stagnation and decline, leaving thus no space for the possibility of 
  43
level of investigation (referring, e.g., to the economic conjuncture in a given country): 
This concrete analysis will show how (and to what extent) the general tendency towards 
innovation and technical change emanating from the structural characteristics of the 
capitalist system as a whole, is concretely materialized34 in the specific case under 
investigation.35  
  
5.4 The Complementarity of Roles according to Marx  
 
We saw above that both Hilferding and Schumpeter considered the separation of roles 
between the capitalist and the entrepreneur to be a consequence of the formation and 
domination of the big monopolistic enterprise.36 However, Marx had already regarded the 
separation of roles as a tendency created by capitalist relations in general: it expresses the 
regularities inherent in the C.M.P., which are imposed upon (all) individual enterprises.  
  Marx conceived of enterprises as bearers of causal relations and trends traceable 
on the level of social capital, i.e. in the framework of the totality of capitalist relations of 
production and distribution. In a similar manner he conceived of entrepreneurs and 
managers as bearers of the functions of capital, irrespective of whether they are the legal 
owners of the enterprise or not. In this view, entrepreneurs and managers become 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a process of restructuring of capitalist production emanating from units other than “monopolistic” enterprises (e.g. 
specific innovative branches comprising mostly small or medium-sized enterprises). 
34 The concrete analysis may show which economic sectors, branches of industry or types of enterprise take the 
initiative of technological change at a given historical moment in a given country, depending on the characteristics of 
the specific conjuncture (e.g. overaccumulation crisis and restructuring of the economy, “de-industrialisation” and 
“tertiarisation”, phase of economic recovery or prosperity etc.). This point of view is supported by a large number of 
empirical studies, which showed that in the 1980s, in many capitalist countries, innovation in the secondary sector had 
as its main vehicle mostly small enterprises (see e.g. Perez 1983, Piore and Sabel 1983, Murray 1987).   
35 It is worth mentioning that in his earlier works, Schumpeter seemed to have allowed for a different view (i.e. a view 
similar to that of Marx). This is apparent in most of his writings preceding Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, i.e. 
before formulating the so-called “Schumpeterian Hypothesis”. In his 1912 Theory of Economic Development 
(Schumpeter 1912: 66), Schumpeter believed that innovations might also originate in new, characteristically small 
firms, which might grow large, although they had started as outsiders. Also, in his Business Cycles he wrote: “It is, of 
course, true that mere size is not necessarily an advantage and may well be a disadvantage. Judgment must turn on the 
merits of each case. But statistical evidence to the effect that smaller concerns often do better than the giants should not 
be uncritically accepted. [I]t is held […] that the big concerns […] implied technological and organisational 
improvement when they were founded. It is not held that they retained their advantages until the present day. Our 
theory would in fact lead us to expect the contrary” (Schumpeter 1939: 404).    
36 The same view is shared by Marxists defending the “monopoly capitalism” paradigm of Marxist theory, which was 
first introduced by Hilferding and was further developed by Soviet Marxists: Catephores (1994: 24) claims so that “the 
separation of the ownership of capital from the management of the production process and from entrepreneurship […] 
fall into place among institutions of late capitalism” of which “Marx gave in Capital only the briefest sketches”. He 
also claims that Marx’s analysis “was carried forward, at the beginning of the century, by Marxist authors like 
Hilferding” (op. cit.). 
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functionaries of capitalist economic control over the means of production and thus 
complement the capitalist legal-owners rather than confront them:  
  “Mr. Ure37 has already noted how it is not the industrial capitalists, but rather the 
industrial managers who are ‘the soul of our industrial system’ […]. Capitalist production 
has itself brought it about that the work of supervision is readily available, quite 
independent of the ownership of capital. It has therefore become superfluous for this 
work of supervision to be performed by the capitalist. A musical conductor need in no 
way be the owner of the instruments in his orchestra, nor does it form part of his function 
as a conductor that he should have any part in paying the ‘wages’ of the other musicians. 
[…] Joint-stock companies in general (developed with the credit system) have the 
tendency to separate this function of managerial work more and more from the 
possession of capital, whether one’s own or borrowed” (Marx 1894: 510, 511, 512). 
 Marx’s remarks on the separation of roles between legal owners and the directors 
of the production process have fuelled interesting discussions among Marxist theorists. 
Commencing from the analyses of Althusser et al. (1965), several Marxist authors 
distinguished between legal and real economic ownership of the means of production 
(see e.g. Bettelheim 1968, 1970; Poulantzas 1968, 1974; Rey 1973). According to these 
approaches, real ownership of the means of production as an economic relationship (that 
is, as comprising the essential content of the relations of production) consists in the 
control of the means, objects and results of the production process. In distinction from 
formal legal ownership, ownership as an (real) economic relation presupposes possession 
of the means of production, i.e. the management of the production process and the power 
to put to utilisation of the means of production. That is to say, ownership as an economic 
relationship exists in a relation of homology (coincidence - correspondence) with the 
possession (management) of the means of production.  In this theoretical tradition, Nicos 
Poulantzas (1974: 180) commented on these theses of Marx: “Marx’s argument is clear: 
while the various powers of ownership and possession belong to the place of capital (they 
are ‘functions’ of capital), they are not necessarily fulfilled by the owner-agents”. This, 
according to Poulantzas, does not mean that the capitalist class is being narrowed (or 
becomes superfluous), but rather that it is being enriched by capitalist strata, who 
                                                          
37 Marx refers here to the following work: A. Ure, Philosophy of Manufacturers, French translation, 1836, I: 67.  
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however do not hold legal ownership of the production means: “The directing agents who 
directly exercise these powers and who fulfil the ‘functions of capital’ occupy the place 
of capital, and thus belong to the bourgeoisie class, even if they do not hold formal legal 
ownership” (Poulantzas 1974: 180). 38  
 Contrarily to this view, both Hilferding and Schumpeter distinguished the 
entrepreneurs and managers from the class of capitalists, who they restricted to the legal 
owners of enterprises:  
 “The perfectly bureaucratized giant industrial unit […] ousts the entrepreneur and 
expropriates the bourgeoisie as a class”, wrote Schumpeter (Schumpeter 1942: 134), who 
thought of entrepreneurs and top managers only as would-be capitalists, in the sense that 
they might acquire property rights, if being successful, and be thus (and only thus) 
incorporated into the bourgeoisie, since they do not form a social class by themselves 
(Heilbroner 1998: 405, 420). Schumpeter (1942: 134) wrote: “Although entrepreneurs are 
not necessarily or even typically elements of that stratum [the bourgeoisie] […] from the 
outset, they nevertheless enter it in case of success […] entrepreneurs do not per se form 
a social class”.  
 Concluding this Section, we suggest that while Marx put emphasis on the 
separation of roles between the legal owner and the directing agents of enterprises 
(entrepreneur or top manager), regarding this separation as an inherent feature of the 
capitalist mode of production, and thus opening the way to conceptualizations and 
theoretical conclusions that understand all these categories of economic agents as 
constituent parts of the bourgeoisie, Schumpeter seems again to move along the 
theoretical path opened by Hilferding’s interpretation (and revision) of Marx’s concepts. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
 
In this paper, the origins of some of Schumpeter’s ideas have been traced back to 
Hilferding’s Finance Capital, concerning two main issues: the market structure and 
                                                          
38 A significant consequence of the above conceptualisation of real ownership, which is considered always to take 
priority over legal ownership, is that socialism cannot be identified with (legal) nationalisation of the means of 
production, but only with the accession of the working class to the real ownership of the means of production. In this 
context, Poulantzas (1970) understood the Soviet Union as a state-capitalist society. 
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technological progress on the one hand and the separation of roles between capitalist(s), 
entrepreneur(s) and manager(s) on the other.  
Taking into consideration the facts that Schumpeter had developed a cordial 
relationship of fellowship and friendship with Hilferding (see section 2 of this paper) and 
that he was well acquainted with his work (as indicated by its discussion in Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy, Imperialism and Social Classes and in his History of 
Economic Analysis), the question was posited of whether Hilferding had actually 
influenced Schumpeter, or both authors simply drew their arguments and ideas from Karl 
Marx’s writings, given their proclaimed affinity with Marx’s work: Hilferding was a 
prominent theoretician of the Marxist camp, Schumpeter was an expert discussant of 
Marx’s work. We consider our attempt to give a first answer to this question to be a 
contribution to the dialogue between Marxist and Schumpeterian political economy, 
which until now remains a very sparsely developed area of analysis.  
The way that we have dealt with and answered this question may be summarized as 
follows: Hilferding’s thought in Finance Capital constitutes a major revision of Marx’s 
“macroeconomic” theoretical system in favour of a “microeconomic” point of view, that 
seeks causality in the individual enterprise (formation of big “monopolistic” enterprises 
and abolition of free competition; the dominant form of individual capital –monopolistic 
enterprise– determines the patterns of evolution of the social capital –of the capitalist 
system as a whole–; a “latest phase” of capitalism has thus emerged). 
Hilferding reversed the Marxian flow of cause and effect in the relationship 
between social and individual capital. In the new paradigm introduced with Finance 
Capital, it is individual capital (monopolistic enterprise) which takes the causal role, and 
thus determines the main features and the mode of evolution of the economy as a whole 
(of social capital). It is exactly this theoretical paradigm that can be traced in 
Schumpeter’s approach. In his own words: “It is therefore quite wrong […] to say […] 
that capitalist enterprise was one, and technological progress a second, distinct factor in 
the observed development in output; they were essentially one and the same thing, or as 
we may also put it, the former was the propelling force of the later” (Schumpeter 1942: 
110, emphasis added).    
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At this point, one must face an issue already raised by Backhouse: “When forgotten 
precursors of later ideas are found, the main interest is often in why they were neglected, 
as much as in the ideas themselves” (Backhouse 1985: 5). Put concretely, why is 
Hilferding’s contribution to the formation of Schumpeter’s ideas systematically 
neglected, whereas Marx’s influence is persistently stressed? 
In our view, the explanation lies in the fact that the new paradigm of Marxian 
economic theory (the theory of “monopoly capitalism”) introduced by Rudolf Hilferding 
was (and is still) considered by many historians of economic thought, especially 
Marxists, to constitute a “development” or a mere “actualisation” of Marx’s theory. This 
is mainly due to the fact that it was soon imposed on the communist and Marxist 
movement as “Marxist orthodoxy” per se, as, in its main tenets, it was adopted by Lenin 
in his pamphlet Imperialism. The last stage of capitalism [1917] and soon after was 
incorporated in the official version of Marxism formulated in the Soviet Union, (see 
Milios 1999, 2001).39 This, we believe, is the reason why many authors regard Marx as 
the forerunner of certain ideas of Schumpeter, and either fully neglect Hilferding’s 
influence, or consider its effect to be meditative in character: Hilferding is supposed to 
have digested and actualized Marx’s analyses, which Schumpeter later adopted.40  
Marx considered that both technical progress, on the one hand, and the separation 
of roles between legal owners of enterprises and entrepreneurs (and managers), on the 
other, are inherent regularities of the capitalist mode of production (not the outcome of 
the formation of the big “monopolistic” enterprise and of an alleged “latest phase” of 
capitalism). This view does not preclude the possibility of technical progress and a 
process of restructuring of the capitalist system based thereon having as its main point of 
departure, or even as its main vehicle, certain economic sectors consisting of small or 
                                                          
39 Official Soviet Marxism presented Lenin’s polemic booklet on Imperialism, which Lenin himself had described in its 
subtitle as “A Popular Outline”, as one of the greatest works in economic literature, which contained the tenets of the 
Marxist analysis of modern capitalism. However, Lenin had the opportunity to criticize the dogmatic codification of 
the “monopoly capitalism” approach: “Nowhere in the world has monopoly capitalism existed in a whole series of 
branches without free competition nor will it exist. […] [I]mperialism and finance capital are a superstructure on the 
old capitalism. If the top is destroyed, the old capitalism is exposed. To maintain that there is such a thing as integral 
imperialism without the old capitalism is merely making the wish father to the thought” (Lenin-internet 1919). 
40 If one considers Hilderding’s analysis in Finance Capital to be a continuation and clarification of Marx’s theory, 
then whatever influence it may have had on Schumpeter would be of purely historiographic interest: Schumpeter might 
have been acquainted with and been influenced by some of Marx’s ideas through Hilferding’s work. Characteristic in 
this context is the affirmation of Catephores that Schumpeter had “certainly absorbed some of the spirit of Marxist 
political analysis […] through […] Rudolf Hilferding” (Catephores 1994: 4). 
  48
medium sized enterprises. Besides, Marx regarded entrepreneurs and managers as bearers 
of real economic ownership of the means of production (of the enterprises), and so 
understood their relation with legal owners of enterprises not as antithetical but as mainly 
complementary in character.  
It may be concluded, therefore, that it is the version of Marxism first shaped by 
Rudolf Hilferding that seems to have exerted a certain influence upon the formation of 
Schumpeter’s theses.41 
From what has followed it is clear that we have no serious reasons to believe that 
Rudolf Hilferding, the influential Austrian Marxist economist and social politician, was 
the first or the only prominent economist to have influenced Joseph Alois Schumpeter.42 
Nor that he has influenced him on all of the theoretical issues and analyses that 
Schumpeter formulated. Our findings, backed by theoretical analysis as well as by 
empirical and textual evidence, supports the conclusion that Schumpeter had most 
probably been influenced by his older compatriot, fellow student, colleague and friend 
Rudolf Hilferding on issues such as the role of the big enterprise in technological 
progress and economic development, the tendency towards trustification of the capitalist 
economy –shaping a “latest phase of capitalism”– and the separation of roles between 
capitalists, entrepreneurs and managers. We limited our conclusions to these issues, 
where it became clear to us that Schumpeter had followed the conceptualizations of the 
new theoretical paradigm that was first introduced into Marxist economic theory by 
Hilferding.  
Closing this paper, we may say that ideas and elaborations that can be traced back 
in the history of economic thought, as demonstrated here regarding the connection of the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis with the classic work of Marxist literature Finance Capital, 
may be very useful for promoting dialogue between different Schools of economic 
thought and for understanding current economic issues. The potential Marxian influences 
behind e.g. Schumpeter’s theory of credit, besides what has been discussed in the present 
paper, could be a good example for future investigation.  
                                                          
41 On this issue, we agree with Catephores (1994: 24) that Schumpeter “completely adopted the concept of the 
emergence of distinct modern epoch of capitalist development, dominated by oligopolies”. 
42 For instance, Hashagen (1919: 205, 210) stated that Schumpeter’s theory of imperialism was anticipated in 1900 by 
Franz Mehring. On the other hand, Werner Sombart (1928: 66-9) as well, had a theory of imperialism similar to that of 
Schumpeter.  
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After all, it was Joseph Schumpeter who, in the mid-twentieth century, toward the 
end of a long and successful career, advised:  
“[I]f, starting my work in economics afresh, I were told that I could study only one 
of [the fundamental fields of economic analysis: economic history, statistics, or theory] 
but could have my choice, it would be economic history that I should choose” 
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